制裁疲劳下欧盟对俄次级外交的调适逻辑研究（2025）

… of US extraterritorial sanctions to the elimination of economic links with Russia, which, according to the EU, is meant to weaken Moscow and strengthen the European Union. Finally, the …

The US and the EU, amongst other nations, responded to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 with a coordinated series of unprecedented sanctions. Expanding upon previous practice, the US sanctions package in particular contained several restrictive measures with extraterritorial application. This article examines the legality of unilateral extraterritorial sanctions imposed by the US, both historically and currently, by reference to the customary international law on state jurisdiction. It is argued that unilateral extraterritorial sanctions exceed the scope of the traditional jurisdictional grounds of territory, nationality, and security. In order to legitimise the current sanctions regime against Russia, which requires at least limited extraterritoriality to be effective, two novel bases of jurisdiction are proposed: reasonableness and anti-evasion. Whilst reasonableness must be rejected as a free-standing jurisdictional principle because of the ambiguity and subjectivity in its application to state practice, anti-evasion should be recognised as creating jurisdiction over conduct designed to circumvent otherwise lawful sanctions.

… Europe and Russia, in response to the threat of Russian intervention in Poland. The sanctions imposed were extraterritorial in … Over time, however, such extraterritorial sanctions have …

Abstract This Article deals with selected issues of judicial protection that arise in the context of the sanctions adopted by the EU against Russia and Belarus after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. As most cases challenging the sanctions are pending, this Article draws lessons from the previous case law on EU restrictive measures. It explores what aspects of the sanctions escape judicial review, then profiles of external (or formal) legality of the sanctions, of internal (or substantive) legality, and concludes by assessing the overall role of the Court in EU foreign affairs. The discussion shows that the case law in this area of EU administrative law converges to a great extent with other areas of EU competence, but tensions remain in how the Court may impose substantial constraints to executive discretion in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy.

International audience

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze how States may counter economic sanctions in line with international law, using the European Union’s (EU) evolving approach as an illustration. After elaborating on the concept of economic sanctions and their political and economic background, this study addresses their legality under international law. On this basis, this paper reflects on the two main EU measures to counter extraterritorial sanctions: the blocking statute and countermeasures. Design/methodology/approach Methodologically, this paper combines doctrinal analysis with research from political science and economics. Findings This paper finds that blocking statutes represent a more cautious approach, whereas countermeasures constitute a more assertive reaction to extraterritorial sanctions. However, both measures remain second-best options in the absence of a compulsory global international dispute settlement system. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature by offering a novel comparison of blocking statutes and countermeasures.

The analysis of specific EU sanctions circumvention measures indicates that the EU is increasing its ‘outward extraterritoriality’, even though the EU reiterates that it does not apply extraterritorial sanctions. For certain goods, EU exporters are obliged to contractually agree on a ‘no re-export’ to Russia clause with foreign operators, which extends the reach of the EU’s sanctions. Such an ‘extraterritoriality by contract’ technique appears to be broadly accepted in State practice in relation to non-proliferation goals. The EU’s ‘frustrating’ criterion, anti-circumvention tool, and ‘best efforts’ requirement indicate that the EU is attempting to extend the reach of its sanctions through varying techniques. The fight against circumvention of EU sanctions on Russia has prompted the EU to expand the reach of its sanctions. It is not excluded that the researched measures to some extent could be justified jurisdictionally from a customary international law perspective, even if extraterritorial, but the EU has not clarified what such jurisdictional justifications would be. Regardless of whether the examined measures comply with jurisdictional principles, third States may view at least some of these new measures as exceeding the bounds permitted by international law.

… economic sanctions, which was exacerbated by the Russia-… in counteracting US extraterritorial sanctions, and maps the … enforcement of the newly adopted EU Anti-Coercion Instrument …

The contemporary international legal system is undergoing serious transformation related to expanding practice of coercive measures applied by individual states beyond of national territory. The author analyzes legal foundations and limitations of modern approaches to justifying state competence in the sphere of restrictive measures. The evolution of terminological system from classical concepts of «countermeasures» and «retorsions» by the International Law Commission to modern politically motivated terms «sanctions», «restrictive measures», and «autonomous sanctions» is studied. Based on analysis of restrictive measures practice by various states, main types of extraterritorial measures are identified by subject composition, nature of impact, scope of objectives, and mechanism of action. Traditional principles of jurisdiction are examined: territoriality, nationality, and protective principle. Legal aspects of their application to extraterritorial measures are explored in detail, including extensive interpretation of territorial principle through «correspondent jurisdiction» and «effects doctrine» concepts, application of nationality principle to controlled companies and exported goods, unjustified extension of protective principle to foreign policy interests. Special attention is paid to legal analysis of secondary sanctions as the most problematic form of extraterritorial coercion. Through practical cases (Helms-Burton Act, BNP Paribas case, sanctions against Russia and Iran), key legal problems are analyzed: non-compliance with requirements of significant jurisdictional nexus, violation of proportionality principle, conflict with sovereign equality principle. The influence of geographic asymmetry in extraterritorial measures application on impossibility of customary international law norm formation is demonstrated. Systemic deficiencies of the «anti-avoidance» concept are revealed. The fundamental conflict between sovereignty principle and effectiveness of restrictive measures under institutional crisis of collective security system is analyzed. Directions for international legal regulation development are proposed, including strengthening multilateral mechanisms, improving judicial procedures, and creating procedural guarantees against abuse of coercive measures.

In recent years, international sanctions have evolved from narrowly targeted financial measures into complex legal instruments with significant procedural consequences. As arbitral disputes increasingly involve parties, jurisdictions, or institutions affected by these sanctions, tribunals are compelled to operate in a legal landscape shaped less by party autonomy than by political imperatives and regulatory risk. Sanctions, particularly those of extraterritorial effect, now threaten to unsettle fundamental assumptions underpinning arbitration: neutrality, accessibility, and procedural equality. This article examines the profound impact of contemporary sanctions on the procedural dimensions of international arbitration. It underscores the longstanding premise that arbitration offers a neutral and effective forum for resolving commercial and investment disputes, largely insulated from geopolitical fluctuations. Yet the growing extraterritorial scope and complexity of sanctions regimes challenge this premise. These measures generate legal and procedural obstacles by restricting access to financial resources, impeding legal representation, and promoting the nationalisation of dispute resolution mechanisms. The article examines the mechanisms of this erosion in six key areas: the doctrine of extraterritoriality, financial barriers, restrictions on legal representation, nationalisation of dispute resolution at the initiative of the State, the deterrent effect on arbitration institutions and the consequences of the latest package of EU sanctions. It contends that sanctions not only undermine the procedural integrity and equality of arms essential to arbitration but actively transform it into a process constrained by political considerations. This transformation jeopardises the principles of party autonomy, procedural neutrality, and access to justice, as parties from sanctioned jurisdictions face difficulties in funding, representation, and participation. Furthermore, the trend towards nationalisation weakens the enforceability of arbitral awards, thereby destabilising arbitration’s reliability as a dispute resolution mechanism. The article concludes that safeguarding the legitimacy and functionality of international arbitration amid growing geopolitical interference requires institutional reforms, including the clarification of compliance policies, harmonisation of legal exemptions for arbitration-related activities, and reinforcement of protections against State interference. Absent such measures, arbitration risks to lose its credibility, compromised by extraterritorial sanctions and national interests.

The adoption, on 21 June 2023, of the eleventh package of sanctions in response to Russia’s on-going military aggression against Ukraine marks an important milestone in the EU sanctions’ practice. These measures, further strengthened by the adoption of the twelfth package of sanctions on 18 December 2023, aim to effectively prevent and combat the circumvention of existing trade sanctions, potentially extending the extraterritorial reach of European sanctions. This article aims to analyse the extent to which this application of extraterritoriality, targeting entities beyond the EU’s jurisdiction, may raise concerns regarding the EU’s compliance with established rules and limitations under international law regarding prescriptive jurisdiction. Firstly, the article provides an overview of the background and content of these new measures, as well as their relationship with the EU’s sanctions regime imposed on Russia since February 2022. Subsequently, it examines the issue of the extraterritorial application of the new ‘anti-circumvention rules’ and the extent to which the EU has gradually embraced a broader (or ‘hard’) understanding of extraterritoriality within the domain of sanctions. It is noteworthy to consider the surprising nature of this development, as the EU has consistently expressed opposition to similar measures when implemented by the US.

EU restrictive measures (sanctions) have long been imposed on individuals like rulers and businesspersons close to rulers who have been committing acts that are contrary to international peace and security. Considering gathered evidence on a sufficiently solid factual basis, and the duty to state reasons, such sanctioning is an accepted form of action that the EU takes, accounting for the provisions of the EU Treaties and adopted secondary law. As the EU sanctions regime has become increasingly sophisticated, the EU has begun to also impose sanctions on the family members of otherwise sanctioned persons, to ensure that EU sanctions are not easily circumvented. This article considers the lawfulness of the EU’s imposition of sanctions on family members of otherwise sanctioned persons, accounting for any potential links or associations that family members may have beyond that of being a mere relative. Whilst the EU extends the reach of its sanctions regime, it must take into account the position in society that the otherwise sanctioned person holds – whether they are members of a governing regime of a third state as a ruler, or whether they are prominent businesspersons who benefit economically from the third state – to determine the lawfulness of also imposing sanctions on their family members. Ultimately, both the Council as the decision-maker, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as the judicial reviewer, will have to balance the interests at stake, until an agreed upon standard can be established, with the result that the threshold for sanctions on the relatives of businesspersons and of relatives is consistent. Restrictive measures, Sanctions, Rules, Relatives, Businesspersons, Governing regime, Family, Family members, Judicial review, Court of Justice of the European Union, Court of Justice, General Court, Common Foreign and Security Policy

The EU is considered the most active international organization in terms of sanctions. Since the start of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 alone, the EU has enacted twelve sanction packages targeting the economies of Russia and Belarus in specific sectors and established a list of over 1900 (As of January 2024, see https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/eu-sanctions-against-russia-following-invasion-ukraine/sanctions-against-individuals-compa nies-and-organisations_en.) individuals and companies subject to assets freezes and travel bans. While those sanctions are targeted and specific, they nevertheless have an effect outside of Russia, due to their vast impact on important economic sectors, import and export and commodity pricing. To put it bluntly, it is virtually impossible to prevent a spillover effect beyond the Russian borders in times of a globalized, interconnected economic reality. The current sanction regime is not only widely impactful, but also a legal curiosity. EU sanctions are not ordinary countermeasures under public international law. They are coordinated acts by a group of States replying to the unlawful conduct of another State against a third. There is no connection strictu sensu between the EU and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. These two particularities – the wide and partially unwanted effects of EU sanctions and their legal uncertainties – give rise to the question: Is there a way to check, balance and mitigate the impact of EU sanctions for those who find themselves to be ‘collateral damage’ thereof? This article argues that investment arbitration can answer this question in the positive. For this purpose, the article will first examine the effects of EU sanctions on non- Russian investors. Consequently, it will analyze the legal nature of EU sanctions under public international law, before turning to the role of investment arbitration and specifically the principle of proportionality to show how investment arbitration may mitigate unwanted results of EU sanctions without diminishing the desired effects of the regime.

… Moreover, the lower GDP and HDI indicates that capabilities (material resources) may not be ‘the most important determinant of a third party’s alignment choices’ when it comes to EU …

… United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU), have developed regulatory frameworks that … Should the system reveal a listed name, which could be that of the client or a third party …

The EU sanctions policy against Russia began back in 2014 as a response to the aggravation of the crisis in Ukraine. In 2022, sanctions (restrictive measures) against Russia were significantly strengthened and acquired a large-scale and unpredictable character. The purpose of this article is to identify the essential characteristics of the EU anti-Russian sanctions and to determine the legal nature of the sanctions, as well as their compliance with international law. It is concluded that the unilateral EU sanctions, contrary to their purpose, are intended to punish Russia by causing maximum damage. International law does not forbid states and their associations to impose unilateral restrictive measures in the economic sphere if they are justified by security considerations. In this context, the verification of the validity of the EU sanctions should be assessed individually for each measure. The author believes that a number of EU restrictive measures taken against the Russian Federation go beyond the scope of the permissions established by international law. This is especially true regarding measures taken in 2022. Moreover, the practice of implementing the adopted restrictive measures is becoming increasingly sophisticated, indicating that the European Union and its individual members are abusing their position.

Sanctions are among the most widely used foreign policy tools of governments and international organizations in response to national or international wrongdoings. Beyond the dichotomous question of whether to adopt or not to adopt sanctions against a target, decision-makers develop different designs when they impose restrictions: targeted sanctions like asset freezes and travel bans, arms embargoes, or economic sanctions such as financial restrictions and commodity bans. What accounts for this variation in the design of sanctions regimes? This article investigates this question by developing a configurational explanation that combines domestic- and international-level factors for the choice of an economic versus a targeted sanctions design. I test these factors on original data mapping European Union (EU) autonomous sanctions against third countries in force in 2019 through set-theoretic methods. The analysis shows that a militarily strong target’s serious misbehavior through grave human rights violations triggers EU action in the form of economic sanctions, however, only in combination with two conditions: first, the EU reacts to a misbehavior through the adoption of an economic design when the United States imposes economic sanctions, too (path 1); second, the salience of a target’s conflict triggers an economic design of sanctions in case of grave human rights violations (path 2).

ABSTRACT The article presents a new perspective to analyse agreements in EU sanctions policy. It presents arguments on how negotiations on sanctions in both the European Council and the Council should be analysed, using the example of restrictive measures imposed against Russia. The paper recognizes that the European Council has become a key decision-maker in EU sanctions policy since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. EU Heads of State and Government are more involved than ever in day-to-day sanctions policy. Further, the article shows that two different mechanisms were present during negotiations on Russian sanctions. While the European Council was largely influenced by norms when agreeing on sanctions, the members of the Council bargained with each other and adopted a decision which reflects the red lines of the Member States.

… Although neither the Treaty on European Union (TEU), nor the Treaty of the … the EU’s competence to enact restrictive measures against non-state actors, the latter were targeted by EU …

… extent does this affect the EU’s sanctions policy in practice? … anti-circumvention mechanisms, some of which are also subject to legal debates (2). Third, the EU sanctions against Russia …

This article examines the evolving legal and institutional framework for implementing and enforcing EU sanctions against Russia in the Netherlands. It highlights key developments, including the Dutch courts’ expanding interpretation of sanctions law, the landmark Dieseko settlement involving the Crimean Bridge, and reforms to the 1977 Sanctions Act. Drawing on recent case law, interviews with legal practitioners, and analysis of enforcement mechanisms, the paper shows how Dutch authorities are balancing regulatory compliance, due process, and financial sector duties. It also addresses institutional fragmentation and the government’s proposal to establish a Central Reporting Office. Through case studies, including trade-based sanctions evasion, real estate linked to sanctioned individuals, forced buyouts of sanctioned minority shareholders, and banking sector disputes; the paper argues that Dutch courts are shaping a nuanced national model of sanctions enforcement. This model emphasizes low thresholds for criminal intent, transparency, and proportionality. The Cicerone case illustrates how courts adapt sanctions enforcement under geopolitical uncertainty, combining EU sanctions law with Ukrainian anticorruption efforts. It reflects a willingness to diverge from EU guidance to protect public interest and legal clarity. Meanwhile, the ABN AMRO case demonstrates a dual expectation of financial institutions: rigorous sanctions compliance and fair treatment of clients. Here, the duty of care doctrine counters excessive risk aversion. Together, this paper offers critical insights for regulators, compliance professionals, and scholars into how EU sanctions are interpreted and enforced at the national level under complex, highrisk conditions. It not only analyzes key court cases, but also contextualizes them within broader legal reforms, institutional dynamics, and evolving enforcement strategies in the Netherlands.

… case in other policy areas—and uniform application of EU law could … respect to earlier anti-circumvention clauses Footnote 83 ). In … of our measures and deny Russia the benefits of G7 …

… The controversies on the legal basis of secondary sanctions should not lead to the conclusion of their unlawful nature in any circumstances. An author has suggested that a wide range …

… secondary sanctions. I end by rejecting the view that multilateral authorisation is a necessary condition for sanctions in general and secondary sanctions … a legal system sanctioning the …

… This is not so in the EU legal system, where acts of secondary legislation are directly … of the so-called “secondary sanctions”, that is to say penalties for violation of the restrictive …

This paper explores the evolving role of participatory enforcement in combating economic crimes, focusing on tax offences, money laundering and sanctions evasion. It examines how EU law increasingly relies on private actors as agents of transparency, particularly through reporting obligations aimed at disclosing and addressing these crimes. Through case studies, the paper highlights the decentralisation of enforcement mechanisms. In the context of taxation, it investigates obliged entities' and—at times—citizens' reporting obligations in combating tax evasion and/or avoidance. Regarding money laundering, it examines both obliged entities as well as the dual role of employees in financial institutions as both mandated reporters and voluntary whistleblowers. For sanctions evasion, the paper explores the unprecedented expansion of reporting duties in the post‐Ukraine conflict era, including the EU's reliance on both citizens and (non‐EU) sanctioned individuals. By analysing these areas of EU law, the paper evaluates the balance between compliance obligations and individual rights and examines the conditions underpinning disclosure requirements. It also assesses the consistency of the EU's reliance on non‐state actors to report economic crimes, raising critical questions about the present and the future of its enforcement mechanisms.

This paper documents a substantial change in regional trade patterns precipitated by the war on Ukraine and the subsequent introduction of trade sanctions on Russia. It provides evidence suggestive of intermediated trade via neighbouring economies being used to circumvent the sanctions. The analysis, based on HS6 product-level data on bilateral monthly exports, shows a sharp drop in direct exports from the EU to Russia following the introduction of sanctions in March 2022. At the same time, an increase in the EU exports to Armenia, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic (CCA3, all members of Eurasian Customs Union alongside Belarus and Russia) is observed. Both patterns are particularly pronounced for product groups partially or fully subject to the EU sanctions as well as goods that are similar to the sanctioned ones. The drop in EU exports to Russia was around 80 percent steeper for sanctioned goods than for other products, while exports of sanctioned goods to CCA3 rose by extra 30 percent relative to those of other goods. The increase in exports of sanctioned goods to CCA3 represents a small fraction of the reduction in their direct exports to Russia but can be large for specific product groups.

Abstract Following the invasion of Ukraine, the USA, UK, and EU governments–among others–sanctioned oligarchs close to Putin. This approach has come under scrutiny, as evidence has emerged of the oligarchs’ successful evasion of these punishments. To address this problem, we analyze the role of an overlooked but highly influential group: the secretive professional intermediaries who create and administer the oligarchs’ offshore financial empires. Drawing on the Offshore Leaks Database provided by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), we examine the ties linking offshore expert advisors (lawyers, accountants, and other wealth management professionals) to ultra-high-net-worth individuals from four countries: Russia, China, the USA, and Hong Kong. We find that resulting nation-level “oligarch networks” share a scale-free structure characterized by a heterogeneity of heavy-tailed degree distributions of wealth managers; however, network topologies diverge across clients from democratic versus autocratic regimes. While generally robust, scale-free networks are fragile when targeted by attacks on highly connected nodes. Our “knock-out” experiments pinpoint this vulnerability to the small group of wealth managers themselves, suggesting that sanctioning these professional intermediaries may be more effective and efficient in disrupting dark finance flows than sanctions on their wealthy clients. This vulnerability is especially pronounced amongst Russian oligarchs, who concentrate their offshore business in a handful of boutique wealth management firms. The distinctive patterns we identify suggest a new approach to sanctions, focused on expert intermediaries to disrupt the finances and alliances of their wealthy clients. More generally, our research contributes to the larger body of work on complexity science and the structures of secrecy.

… organizations overcome economic sanctions that lead to … , intermediary, and targeted countries, we synthesized six main friendshoring models often used in instances where sanctions …

… or financial intermediary when the evasion instrument deployed … : primary sanctions directed at the designated entity, secondary … with US secondary sanctions in defiance of EU law — …

This chapter delves into the question of the impact of extraterritorial and secondary sanctions on private contractual relations. It opens with a discussion of the characterisation of extraterritorial and secondary sanctions as potential legal or factual impediments to the performance of contractual obligations. A detailed analysis of the case law follows, bringing to the fore some degree of reluctance on the part of judicial authorities to allow operators to suspend the performance of their contractual obligations or to terminate contractual relations on account of their exposure to extraterritorial or secondary sanctions, at least in the absence of sanctions or force majeure contractual clauses. The chapter also explores the potential tension between such sanctions, on the one hand, and measures – commonly referred to as blocking statutes – enacted by states or by the EU to thwart their effects, on the other hand. A discussion, in this respect, of the relevant case law reveals a quest for a balance between policy objectives and economic soundness and shows the existence of incongruent views on the compatibility of sanctions clauses with blocking statutes.

… The collateral effects of these sanctions have reverberated globally, raising questions about … boundaries framing EU sanctions, examining the principle of proportionality across EU law, …