传统税收征管（不包含数字化税收征管）对于公司治理的直接影响和间接影响

… State Taxation Administration of China, the Chinese tax authorities … We posit that corporate ESG performance exhibits a … and a corporate governance effect, capable of curbing corporate …

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the effect of family ownership on corporate tax avoidance. It also investigates whether audit quality affects tax avoidance practices by family firms. Design/methodology/approach Based on a sample of 55 Tunisian listed companies from 2008 to 2013, the authors use GLS regression models estimated with robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. Findings The results show that family ownership is positively associated with corporate tax avoidance practices, suggesting that families expropriate minority interests by extracting rents from tax-saving positions. These practices are less prominent after the 2011 Tunisian revolution, suggesting that the pressure from governments and non-governmental organizations against corruption and unethical behavior has increased after the revolution. However, the findings show that audit quality curbs the incentives of family firms to engage in aggressive tax positions, supporting the moderating effect of audit quality on the relation between family ownership and tax avoidance. Research limitations/implications These findings suggest that Tunisian family firms are likely to expropriate minority interests by extracting rents from tax-saving positions. However, in presence of high-quality audit, the relation turns negative, suggesting that external audit quality is an efficient corporate governance device that is likely to monitor family corporate decisions. Originality/value This paper extends previous research by investigating the moderating effect of external audit quality on the relation between tax avoidance and family ownership. It also examines tax avoidance by family firms in a unique setting: Tunisia, a transitioning economy subsequently to the 2011 revolution, where investors’ rights are weakly protected and the financial market is not well-developed as in more developed countries.

The serious decline in the price of crude oil in recent years has led the federal government to look for new sources of revenue and becomes strict and aggressive to the assessment and collection of revenue from other sources. This study examines the impact of Corporate Governance Attributes on Tax planning of listed Nigerian Conglomerate companies. The corporate governance parameters include board size and CEO tenure while tax planning is proxied by the effective tax rate and firm size as control variable. The objective is to determine the relationship between corporate governance attributes and tax planning which in turn may improve firm performance. The study adopts ex-post facto research design and utilized panel data from annual reports and accounts of the listed companies for the period of five years (2014-2018). The Data were analyzed using a panel regression technique to assess the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable. Hausman specification test was conducted to choose between fixed and random effect estimation and the pvalue is 0.9863 which insignificant. Therefore, results from random effect estimation model was interpreted which indicates a negative and significant relationship between CEOT, FSIZE and ETR and a positive relationship between BSIZE and ETR. Therefore, the study concludes that corporate governance mechanism plays a significant role in tax planning of listed Nigerian Conglomerate Companies.

Corporate tax avoidance has been a matter of considerable public attention, particularly since the 2008 global financial crisis. The nature of calls for tax reform and increased regulation, advocated most prominently by tax activists and NGOs, has revolved around transparency as a possible corrective to unacceptable tax avoidance, although there is no consensus as to what the term tax avoidance encompasses and when it becomes unacceptable. We examine two responses to calls for increased transparency about the tax affairs of multinational entities: firstly, country by country reporting that provides information to tax authorities, and secondly the UK requirement for publication of tax strategies, whereby large companies put information into the public domain. We find considerable misunderstanding about the benefits of transparency in this setting. By failing to consider the limits of transparency initiatives there is a risk of dysfunctional consequences, for example additional costs in providing and processing additional information, the prospect of increased disputes as new information generates new misinterpretations and uncertainty in determining the final tax position. There is a risk that greater disclosure will not effectively address concerns about unacceptable corporate tax avoidance.

PurposeThis study sheds light on the determinants related to the corporate board of directors and the firms’ ownership nature of tax aggressiveness strategies of Tunisian listed firms and what could be their effect on its level in a postrevolution context.Design/methodology/approachOur research considers only nonfinancial firms listed in the Tunisian stock exchange during the 2011–2017 period. It is based on unbalanced panel data.FindingsFindings suggest that women presence on the corporate board, CEO duality, the managerial and institutional ownership regularize significantly the level and the management's behavior of engagement in tax aggressiveness practices and reduce the firm’s overall risks of its consequences in terms of tax positions stability.Research limitations/implicationsOur investigation considers only nonfinancial firms to avoid noisy results and for the significant differences between accounting standards within financial and nonfinancial firms, besides sample homogeneity and comparability considerations.Practical implicationsThis study provides evidence that some governance mechanisms, even reasonably dedicated to consider the risk of tax aggressiveness and to prevent its consequences, have a paradoxical effect and amplify the tax aggressiveness’ level rather than defending the firm’s viability and its financial stability. It offers signals to managers about specific governance attributes that strengthen and/or control the extent of tax aggressive strategies.Social implicationsThis research gives a particular road map for society, investors and practitioners to depict the firms’ level of tax aggressiveness and especially to understand its attributes related to the corporate board of directors and the ownership's nature through evidences from a postrevolution context.Originality/valueOur research contributes to prior literature by examining the effect of corporate board characteristics and different ownership natures on the extent of tax aggressiveness during and after the revolution period in Tunisia and confirms and infers some prior findings of tax aggressive determinants in underdevelopment context.

This study explores how corporate governance shapes tax avoidance behavior in firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). Specifically, this research seeks to answer whether corporate governance mechanisms, namely board size, ownership concentration, board gender diversity, institutional ownership, and audit quality, significantly influence corporate tax avoidance. Although numerous prior studies have investigated the link between governance mechanisms and tax avoidance, limited evidence is available within the Indonesian context. A quantitative method is applied using secondary data from annual reports of IDX-listed firms during the 2019–2023 period. The findings indicate that corporate governance does not uniformly constrain tax avoidance behavior, as board size shows a negative association with tax avoidance, while other governance variables exhibit no significant effect. These results contribute to the literature by clarifying the role of governance mechanisms in shaping corporate tax behavior in emerging markets.

The article presents a comprehensive theoretical and methodological study of transfer pricing as a key instrument of corporate governance and state regulation in the field of foreign economic activity. It is shown that transfer pricing is a mechanism that integrates economic, managerial, and regulatory processes into a single system, forming the basis for effective interaction between enterprises and state institutions, and international regulators.The study substantiates the synergistic role of transfer pricing in the formation of an adaptive model of corporate governance, in which internal business decisions are aligned with external regulatory norms. It is revealed that through the use of transfer pricing, enterprises are able to optimally distribute functions, risks, and resources between structural units and group companies, which is a necessary condition for the effective management of global value chains. It is proven that transfer pricing acts as a mechanism for balancing the interests of participants in transnational processes.The article shows that the implementation of effective transfer pricing policies contributes to the minimization of tax, financial, and regulatory risks, increases the level of trust on the part of international partners, and strengthens the reputation capital of the enterprise in global markets. Particular attention is paid to the role of transfer pricing in tax planning, as its use allows enterprises to align their income and expense structures with international BEPS standards, while ensuring the efficiency of business processes and compliance with regulatory norms.The results obtained allow us to conclude that the synergy of corporate and state aspects of transfer pricing creates strategic advantages not only for individual companies but also for the development of the national economy as a whole.

Abstract This paper synthesizes the major empirical findings of the burgeoning tax avoidance research in China from the accounting, finance, and economics literature over the last 13 years. It surveys the evidence in four main areas: (1) the mechanisms through which Chinese firms avoid income taxes; (2) the effects of government ownership and agency problem on tax avoidance; (3) tax avoidance and political connections; and (4) the roles of book-tax conformity, tax enforcement, and corporate governance. It also discusses the appropriateness of tax avoidance measures in the Chinese setting. Finally, it proposes important directions for future research.

Political economy scholarship generally assumes that governments are interested in enforcing economic regulations. Cases of non‐enforcement are predominantly studied in the context of developing countries and are chiefly associated with states' deficient institutional capacity. This article casts doubts on these assumptions by showing how governments in advanced democracies manipulate the regulatory regime and generate selective non‐enforcement of economic regulations to shape markets at their discretion. We argue that regulatory forbearance becomes an attractive form of industrial policy when governments are prevented from intervening discretionally in markets due to legal obstacles, which they cannot overcome; or when the productive structure of the country makes alternative forms of intervention unviable. Drawing on the study of tax non‐enforcement in two most‐different cases of strong and weak state capacity such as Germany and Italy, the article theorizes three techniques through which governments manipulate regulatory regimes: legal and organizational sabotage and shirking. By shedding light on the economic logic of forbearance, the article points at non‐enforcement as an overlooked mode of regulatory governance and suggests the need to inquire further into governments' strategic agency behind regulatory regimes.

In this article, we review recent literature (79 articles) on the impact of corporate governance on corporate tax avoidance. Applying a stakeholder-oriented view, we find that various aspects of corporate governance, such as incentive alignment between management and shareholders, board composition, ownership structure, capital market monitoring, audit, enforcement and government relations, and other stakeholders’ pressure have a strong influence on corporate tax avoidance. Findings indicate that effective corporate governance mechanisms steer tax avoidance at its firm-specific optimal level. The classical principal-agent theory, however, fails to fully explain corporate tax avoidance as an outcome. Investigating the determinants of corporate tax avoidance requires a more comprehensive approach taking into account corporate governance institutions and all stakeholders relevant to the firm. We show that corporate governance institutions not only have the potential to increase tax avoidance, making firms more profitable, but also to limit tax avoidance to a level where the arising risks do not outweigh the benefits.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of country-level governance and accounting standards on corporate tax avoidance. Design/methodology/approach This paper is an empirical work using a sample of listed companies from 36 countries. Findings This paper finds that firms resident in countries with stronger country-level governance engage in less tax avoidance. Aspects of stronger country-level governance include higher government effectiveness and regulatory quality, and stronger enforcement of law and control of corruption. This paper also finds that firms adopting international accounting standards (IFRS) engage in less tax avoidance than those using local accounting standards. Further examination of the effect of interactions between country-level governance and the adoption of IFRS on tax avoidance finds that there is a substitute relationship between country-level governance and the adoption of IFRS. Social implications This study has significant implications for policy makers, corporate management and academics. It documents that when a country implements governance targeting improving government effectiveness, enhancing regulatory quality, strengthening enforcement of laws and controlling corruption, this will lead to less corporate tax avoidance. It also shows that the adoption of IFRS will reduce corporate tax avoidance, probably by enhancing accounting quality and disclosure, and that the adoption of IFRS provides a bond mechanism in reducing tax avoidance in countries with weak governance. Originality/value This paper is the first study to examine the impact of country-level governance on tax avoidance at the corporate level. It is also the first study to examine how country-level governance interplays with IFRS in shaping firms’ tax avoidance activities.

When analyzing the influence of taxation on agency conflicts between firm owners and managers, one can draw on theoretical principal–agent literature from various research fields. In recent years, this interdisciplinary research has grown significantly covering research with regards to optimal compensation, investment decisions, tax avoidance and transfer pricing while analyzing the effects of corporate income taxes, wage taxes, bonus taxes and shareholder taxes. Our paper provides a comprehensive review of analytical literature that studies the influence of taxation on agency conflicts between firm owners and managers. Above and beyond summarizing research findings, we discuss how taxes are commonly implemented in agency models, derive empirical predictions, and identify research gaps for future tax research.

… same, the firm engages in less tax avoidance. Furthermore, we expect the tax enforcement … 2012), and we examine their governance impacts on firms’ TA (Desai and Dharmapala 2009)…

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine the impact of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on the probability of engaging in tax aggressiveness.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses a sample of 52 firms listed on the Tunis stock exchange observed over the 2003–2016 period (The authors had to stop sampling in 2016 because the measurement of tax aggressiveness requires 4 years after the year of study. Therefore, the data on the measurement of tax aggressiveness were collected until 2020). This paper uses the logistic regression technique.FindingsThe results of the first logistic regression show that ownership structure and the supervision role of the tax authorities are determining factors that explain tax aggressiveness; while, the attributes of the board of directors does not seem to explain the probability of engaging in aggressive tax strategies. To further probe this question, the authors carried out additional analyses that examine the moderating effect of controlling shareholders on the relationship between the attributes of the board and tax aggressiveness. The results of our additional regressions indicate that the effect of these attributes improves in cases of non-presence of a controlling shareholder. This implies that the role that the board of directors can play in controlling management is possibly conditioned by the presence or no of control block holders.Research limitations/implicationsThe major limitation of this study is that it concentrates only on Tunisian listed companies because they are the only companies the financial statements of which are publicly available in Tunisia. Although the sample is relatively small due to the problem of data availability, it appears to be satisfactory given the 15-year sampling period (i.e. from 2003 to 2016).Practical implicationsThe results of the study may help Tunisian regulators create requirements for corporate governance (such as the size of the board of directors and audit committee or the concentration of ownership). Moreover, this study not only focuses on the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on tax aggressiveness but also provides shareholders with information on the governance mechanisms to which they should pay more attention in their desire to obtain more efficient tax results.Social implicationsThe findings are also useful for tax policymakers seeking to identify the circumstances that give rise to an increased risk of tax aggressiveness, as tax aggressive behavior and the resulting non-payment of taxes also have societal implications. In fact, taxes also play an important role in financing the provision of public goods, making corporation tax a matter of public concern.Originality/valueThe present study differs from others in the existing literature by designing a more precise measure of tax aggressiveness and examining the interaction between two internal governance mechanisms; the presence of a controlling shareholder and the attributes of the board of directors. This study also examines the impact of the control exercised by the tax authorities on the behavior of firms in terms of tax aggressiveness.

… ABSTRACT: Using data obtained from a local tax office … corporate tax audits and the consequences of those audits. We find that the tax authority is more likely to select a firm for an audit …

… The effective tax rates of a sample of 55 non-financial … a proxy of tax planning and were regressed on corporate governance … and firm variables which included board size, audit firm size, …

… internal audit systems … , corporate governance, and corporate tax avoidance, particularly in Asian markets. It offers valuable recommendations for strengthening corporate governance …

This study aims to verify the correlation between financial distress and earnings management of tax aggressiveness moderated by corporate governance. This study uses a population of manufacturing companies that publish their financial statement on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2017 until 2018. Sample collection was performed using a purposive sampling method, resulting in a total of 212 populations that published complete financial reports. This study was tested by using the Multiple Regression Analysis test. This research gave empirical proofs that financial distress and real earnings management positively influenced the tax aggressiveness was supported, the proportion of independent commissioners weakened the financial distress and negatively impacted the tax aggressiveness was supported, the total audit committees weakened the financial distress and negatively influenced the tax aggressiveness was not supported, the proportion of independent commissioners and total audit committees weakened the real earnings management and negatively affected the tax aggressiveness was not supported

… It is convenient for tax authorities to lock on the audit object, which significantly improves … Next, we examine the influence of internal corporate governance on the effectiveness of tax …

Post 1998 economic crisis era, Good corporate governance (GCG) or "Tata Kelola Perusahaan yang Baik" emerged as a guideline for companies in Indonesia. This guideline promotes responsible business practices regarding three aspetcs: economic, social, and legal (including tax liability). This research seeks to the effect of applying GCG to tax avoidance on multinational companies, and analyzes how the increase of tax audit coverage ratio as a variable that moderates this relationship. The author analyses how the strenghtening tax policy during the period of 2014-2017 affects the relationship of the application of GCG on multinational companies to tax avoidance. This is a quantitative research by applying descriptive statistical analysis and regression analysis. This research aims to provide an overview to policy makers in understanding the effect of increasing tax audit coverage ratio to taxpayers’ behaviour in implementing GCG associated with tax avoidance.

… corporate governance and strategic tax behaviors, first, by using tax law to better understand corporate governance … purposes in order to minimize the risk of tax audits and tax penalties …

INTRODUCTION The ownership structure of companies in Indonesia tends to be concentrated. Those companies are controlled by few shareholders, hereinafter referred to as controlling shareholders (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Siregar, 2007; Diyanty, 2012). Concentrated ownership canreduce the agency problem between shareholders and management. However, it will create a conflict of interest between controlling shareholder and non-controlling shareholder due to separation of control and cash flow rights through interenterprise pyramid structure or cross-holdings. According to La Porta, Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), control right is the percentage of voting rights of shareholders to participate in policy decisions of the company, while the cash flow right is shareholders’ financial claims against the company based on the percentage of investment. Shareholders’ control right in the company should be represented by the shareholders’ cash flow Vol. 8 | No. 3 ISSN: 2089-6271 | e-ISSN: 2338-4565 Controlling Shareholder and Tax Avoidance: Family Ownership and Corporate Governance

… 5 In Section IVC, we discuss the predictions of an extended model in which firms can also evade taxes by misreporting their input costs. We fully derive the extended model in online …

Can resource-constrained tax administrations rely on third-party auditors to overcome conflict of interest and increase compliance? We evaluate a notched policy in India which …

… impact of corporate fraud on agency costs, and underscored the importance of … tax enforcement successfully increases the tax compliance of firms. Consequently, the decrease in tax …

The government tends to collect the tax on every potential tax objects optimally, while the tax payers tends to look for alternatives in the tax regulation on how to legally minimizing the tax payment. This contradictory condition has motivated the researcher to check whether certain factors influencing tax avoidance. Tax payers will conduct tax planning in order to have tax avoidance. This paper aims to examine the influence of independent commissioner, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, return on assets, firm size, leverage, sales growth, capital intensity ratio and inventory intensity ratio on tax avoidance. The data is all manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2014-2016. The sample are selected using purposive sampling method. Only 61 out of 134 listed manufacturing companies meet the sampling criteria, which resulting 183 data available for testing. The multiple regression analysis is used to test the influence of each independent variables on tax avoidance. The result indicates that institutional ownership and return on asset have significant influence on tax avoidance, however, independent commissioner, managerial ownership, firm size, leverage, sales growth, capital intensity ratio and inventory intensity ratio do not have significant influence on tax avoidance. Keywords—tax avoidance; tax planning; institutional ownership; return on assets

Abstract Based mainly on agency theory, this research examines the impacts of tax enforcement and independent audit on the internal control effectiveness and financial reporting quality in Vietnam enterprises. The data analysis is applied to PLS-SEM. The survey method was carried out on a sample of 341 enterprises with headquarters mainly in the three largest cities of Vietnam (Hanoi, Hochiminh and Danang cities) from April to June 2021. The result findings showed that all three factors: independent audit, tax enforcement, and internal control effectiveness, have significant impacts on the financial reporting quality; particularly, tax enforcement has a negative effect while the other two factors have a positive impact. This research’s main contribution is the negative relationship between tax enforcement and financial reporting quality. This result shows the contractionary view with other existing research. The difference in this research’s findings compared to other existing research was explained in theoretical and practical perspectives. In addition, the mediating role of internal control in the relationship between tax enforcement, independent audit and financial reporting quality was confirmed through results. The findings of this research are very important in proposing regulations and policies related to implementing the monitoring mechanism from both inside (internal control system) and outside the enterprise (independent audit, tax enforcement) to increase the quality of financial reports.

… may lower the reputational, legislative, and enforcement risks for these firms by curtailing tax aggressiveness.EY (2013) suggests considering each of the five COSO components in …

This paper reviews recent economic research in tax compliance and enforcement. After briefly laying out the economics of tax evasion, it focuses on recent empirical contributions. It first discusses what methodologies and data have facilitated these contributions, and then presents critical summaries of what has been learned. It discusses a promising new development—the analysis of randomized controlled trials mostly delivered via letters from the tax authority—and then reviews recent research using various methods about the impact of the principal enforcement tax policy instruments: audits, information reporting, and remittance regimes. I also explore several understudied issues worthy of more research attention. The paper closes by outlining a normative framework based on the behavioral response elasticities now being credibly estimated that allow one to assess whether a given enforcement intervention is worth doing. (JEL H26, H30)

… Section 2 reviews the literature on tax enforcement and on uncertain tax benefits, and locates the present paper at their intersection. Section 3 describes the institutional setting — the …

Using a large sample of unlisted industrial firms in China, we find that a decrease in local governments’ land transfer revenues leads to lower tax avoidance by firms within their jurisdiction. Our cross-sectional variation tests suggest that the tax-avoidance-reduction effect is stronger in cities with higher land finance dependence and government intervention, as well as where the political leaders have stronger promotion incentives. However, the effect is moderated for politically connected firms. Further analysis reveals that intensified tax enforcement is the mechanism through which land transfer revenue losses result in decreased tax avoidance. Our study offers novel evidence on a previously underexplored determinant of corporate tax avoidance through the lens of land finance. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

PurposeThis study examines the effect of board characteristics on the tax aggressiveness of listed companies on the Colombo Stock Exchange in Sri Lanka.Design/methodology/approachThe sample consists of 264 firm-year observations of non-financial listed companies in Sri Lanka from 2014 to 2019. The dynamic panel system GMM technique was used to test the hypotheses, and further analyses were performed using the propensity score matching technique.FindingsAll four effective tax rate measures' mean values were lower than the statutory tax rate, indicating the likelihood of tax planning. Whether board attributes are likely to mitigate tax aggressiveness is uncertain because the results are inconsistent and depend on the ETR measure. Similarly, the logistic regression results derived using the PSM approach are inconsistent, suggesting that board characteristics may have a limited effect on tax aggressiveness. Hence, the corporate governance-tax aggressiveness nexus is limited in the case of Sri Lanka.Research limitations/implicationsThis investigation is limited to non-financial listed companies in Sri Lanka and incorporates only four tax aggressiveness measures. Findings are imperative for policymakers, regulators, and professional bodies to improve corporate governance codes and rules to enhance organisational transparency toward corporate tax payments.Social implicationsAggressive tax planning by companies will reduce government tax revenue, hinder social progress, and cause public mistrust of large corporations and institutions.Originality/valueThis study provides insight into the nexus between corporate governance and tax aggressiveness in a middle-income economy in South Asia hit by an economic crisis where tax revenue has fallen and tax enforcement is weak.

Local governments play dual, but conflicting, roles in China's tax system. That is, they are both tax collectors and controlling shareholders of firms subject to tax payments. We investigate how local governments balance their tax collection and tax avoidance incentives. We find that the conflicts between central and local governments arising from the 2002 tax sharing reform have led to more tax avoidance by local government-controlled firms, particularly when the local government's ownership percentage of the firms is higher than the tax sharing ratio. We also find evidence that the overall level of tax avoidance by local government-controlled firms in a region is positively associated with local fiscal deficits. As a high level of government ownership of corporations and intergovernmental tax sharing are common phenomena in many transitional economies, this study offers valuable insights into how the dual roles played by local governments affect tax policy enforcement in these economies. JEL Classifications: H26; H71; M40; G38.

… This study examines whether tax administration assignment causally affects corporate … reflect genuine causal effects of tax administration structures on corporate energy efficiency rather …

… experiment in tax policy and tax administration design in … The dual role of the state as tax collector and owner of enterprises … a description of the tax structures by main type of tax. In the …

The intense development in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (IR 4.0) demands tight governance of tax audit enforcement by the Inland Revenue Board Malaysia (IRBM) on firms claiming automation incentive. Through tax audit enforcement, IRBM provides a monitoring mechanism for corporate governance. However, due to data confidentiality, little has been established on what indicators that caused tax authority to carry out tax audits. In this research, we employed tax return and historical audit data of corporate taxpayers consisting of profitable and loss firms which consistently claim the Reinvestment Allowance (RA) to examine the indicators applied by the tax authority in executing the role of governance. Employing Binary logistic regression, firm characteristic of firms experiencing tax audit was observable, but tax avoidance and incentive utilization indicators were not apparent. Tax avoidance indicators such as effective tax rate and book-tax difference, loss firms, and incentive utilization receive less attention when it comes to tax audit enforcement. Examining firms that experienced tax audit enforcement has enriched our understanding of indicators that draw the interest of tax authorities when it comes to tax audits. Overall, this research could be the first in Malaysia that has used actual historical tax audit record, which has revealed new evidence on the indicators preferred by the IRBM in conducting a tax audit. The slight fine-tuning of the responses, especially on tax avoidance and incentive utilization indicators for tax enforcement might produce comprehensive tax audit coverage and yield a greater mechanism for governance.

The implementation of the horizontal monitoring (HM) model of cooperation represents a shift in the prevailing command-and-control paradigm towards enhanced cooperation between taxpayers and tax authorities. HM might be assessed through the prism of regulatory changes resulting from the OECD/G20 recommendations and local tax policies aiming at anti-avoidance and the resulting increased level of tax exposure. The aim of this chapter is to examine the principles of transparency between the taxpayer and tax authorities to create trust-based horizontal cooperation and monitoring programmes. The analysis in the chapter adopts a comparative perspective of selected EU countries&s; models – special attention is given to the HM programme launched in Poland – in light of the OECD principles of the cooperative compliance model. The findings presented in the chapter support the conclusion that effective cooperative compliance must be accompanied by full compliance of the taxpayers&s; position but, even more importantly, by the trust and transparency principles followed by the tax authorities, both in establishing the conditions for entering into such a programme and in subsequent cooperation, with volatility and unpredictability of tax regulations raised as the main obstacle to its implementation.

This study aims to explore how tax planning practices impact firm value, with a specific focus on gender diversity as a moderating factor shaping the relationship between tax planning and firm value. Data collection involved purposive sampling, resulting in 121 samples drawn from manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2018 and 2022. Employing panel data analysis supplemented by moderated regression analysis, the research uncovered several key insights. Tax planning and inflation rates exert a negative influence on firm value, whereas dividend policy and profitability have a positive impact. Interestingly, board gender diversity was found to weaken the effect of tax planning on firm value, implying that board gender diversity can significantly affect the efficacy of tax planning strategies in enhancing company value. These findings offer valuable insights for refining tax planning strategies within the manufacturing sector, considering various factors that influence firm value. Moreover, this study contributes to the existing literature on tax planning and corporate governance, laying a groundwork for further exploration and aiding in the evolution of more robust theories and frameworks in this scope.