绿色相互依赖的安全化:东南亚四国对华绿色合作政策分化的生成机制
理论工具(一):相互依赖的非对称性、武器化与绿色脱钩
这组文献构成全报告最上层的理论前提:从"依赖还是相互依赖"的选择逻辑、复合相互依赖中的非对称权力、能源关系的武器化与制裁式经济胁迫,到绿色脱钩(geoeconomic interdependence 与 environmental regulation)如何将环境规制转化为地缘经济工具,再到全球金融集体安全与"从单极到碎片化"的秩序转型、霸权兴衰的长周期视角。它们共同回答"绿色相互依赖为何可以被转化为权力、又为何在秩序碎片化时代更容易被武器化",为四国政策分化提供结构性解释前提。
- A Choice between Dependence and Interdependence: The Baltic States in Quest for Peace and Prosperity(Viljar Veebel, 2014, Journal of Programming Languages)
- THE WEAPONIZATION OF INTERDEPENDENCE: ENERGY SECURITY AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE GREEN TRANSITION(Катерина Рудь, 2026, Politics & Security)
- THE WEAPONIZATION OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE: SANCTIONS, FINANCIAL STATECRAFT, AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER(Abdulkarim Abdullahi, Abdulrazak Salihu Ibrahim, Muhammad Alamin Mahmud, 2025, International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Review)
- Green Decoupling: Geoeconomic Interdependence, Environmental Regulation, And The Reconfiguration Of Global Supply Chains After 2020(Ze Chen, 2025, International Journal of Environmental Science)
- Global Finance and Collective Security(Georgi Ivanov, 2011, No journal)
- From Unipolarity to Fragmentation: Dilemmas of Shaping “Globalization 2.0”(M. Nikitina, M. Kuznetsov, 2026, World Economy and International Relations)
- The Rise and fall of the Australian Agricultural Visa: An Analysis of Labor Migration Policies in the Context of Regional Geopolitics(A. D. Saputra, 2024, Journal of Social Science)
理论工具(二):安全化理论的拓展——安全泛化陷阱、技术管辖与经济治国术
这组文献把安全化从话语分析推进为可操作的机制理论:"国家安全泛化陷阱"解释经济议题被无差别安全化后的自我强化;技术出口的"管辖政治"说明技术标准与出口管制如何成为边界划定工具;"回应性安全化"刻画中国如何以经济治国术反向塑造他国的安全叙事;"被安全化的能源关系"与 TPP 的经济霸权分析则展示自贸协定与能源联结如何被卷入大国竞争。它们为"绿色相互依赖的安全化"提供概念装置与因果机制,与前一组(结构与非对称性)互补而不重叠。
- The national security overflow trap: Analyzing the causes of "security overflow" in the U.S.-China strategic competition(Xiaoxiao Zeng, 2025, Interdisciplinary Humanities and Communication Studies)
- The jurisdictional politics of technology: export controls and the fragmentation of knowledge networks(Yi-Pei Lu, Calvin Lin, 2026, Journal of Applied Economics and Policy Studies)
- Responsive Securitization: How China’s Economic Statecraft Prompted Policy Change in the European Union(S. Weil, J. Gottwald, M. Taube, 2025, Journal of East Asia Security)
- The Securitized Energy Relationship(Amer Ababakr, 2022, Security science journal)
- The TPP and Economic Hegemony: How the U.S. Uses Economic Securitization to Shape the Architecture of the Asia-Pacific Region(Yue Huang, 2025, Общество политика экономика право)
外部结构环境:中美战略竞争、绿色技术标准之争与贸易—安全联结
这组文献刻画四国制定对华绿色合作政策时所面对的地区结构性约束:美国对东盟的经济技术外交、美式"贸易—安全联结"路径、绿色技术作为竞争新领域与标准主导权之争、中美绿色能源合作的有限空间,以及东南亚在"解开复合相互依赖"进程中从受益者转为外溢风险承受者的处境。它们解释的是体系与区域层面的压力来源,而非任何单一国家的政策选择,因此与前两组理论文献形成"结构—机制"的分工。
- US Policy towards ASEAN: the Impact on Regional Economic Relations(K. Chudinova, 2022, Russia and America in the 21st Century)
- US Approaches to the Trade-Security Nexus in East Asia: From Securitization to Resecuritization(M. Koo, 2019, Asian Perspective)
- GREEN TECH AS A NEW AREA OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA(A. A. Rogozhin, 2024, Southeast Asia: Actual Problems of Development)
- United States-China Green Energy Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges (2021-2024)(Alfajri Alfajri, Fini Aktalya, Muhammad Arsy Ash Siddiqy, 2026, Journal of Political Issues)
- Unwinding Complex Interdependence: Implications for Economic Security in Southeast Asia(N. Hamilton-Hart, 2026, Contemporary Southeast Asia)
区域安全化情境:东南亚(及东北亚)非传统安全与环境能源议题的安全化效应
这组文献把安全化理论落地到本区域的经验情境:环境议题(雾霾、水资源、气候)在东南亚被国家与社会行为体安全化的路径,"超越安全化"的非传统安全治理如何抑制或催生区域合作,以及东北亚可再生能源合作作为对照案例显示的制度化可能性。它们提供"安全化—合作"张力的区域底色,是解释四国威胁认知差异的情境前提,区别于第7组聚焦南海争端的触发机制。
- The Securitization of Environmental Issues in Southeast Asia(Apriwan Apriwan, 2015, The Journal of international studies)
- 1. Beyond Securitization: Governing NTS Issues in Southeast Asia(Mely Caballero-Anthony, Li-Na Gong, 2020, Non-Traditional Security Issues in ASEAN)
- Renewable energy cooperation in Northeast Asia: Incentives, mechanisms and challenges(Meng Xiangchengzhen, Serafettin Yilmaz, 2020, Energy Strategy Reviews)
中国绿色合作的政策供给:能源安全诉求、绿色低碳战略与对东盟能源外交
这组文献聚焦分化的"供给侧自变量":中国能源安全关切如何塑造其周边外交与对外能源行为、亚洲能源安全前景的地区含义、绿色低碳政策体系与能源战略的"软转向"、对东南亚的能源外交工具箱,以及中国—东盟绿色发展合作与中菲/中国与东南亚关系的具体制度安排。它们回答"中国为何以及以何种政策工具向东南亚输出绿色合作议程",是解释四国面对的共同"机会集"。
- The Role of Energy Security in China's Neighborhood Diplomacy toward Southeast Asia(Khanh Quoc Vuong, 2026, Review of Law and Social Sciences)
- Energy Security in Asia: Prospects for Regional Cooperation(N. Lucas, 2014, No journal)
- China’s Policy Strategies for Green Low-Carbon Development: Perspective from South-South Cooperation(2023, No journal)
- Emerging Soft Turn in China's Energy Security Cooperation with Southeast Asia(Xue Gong, Daniel Balazs, 2021, China Review)
- CHINA'S ENERGY DIPLOMACY POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY(Nhung Thi Cam Tran, M. Minh, 2025, Thu Dau Mot University Journal of Science)
- China-ASEAN Economic Cooperation in Green Development: Opportunities and Challenges(Qiujuan Huang, 2025, Frontiers in Business, Economics and Management)
- Study on the Relationship Between China's Economic Development Trend and Southeast Asian Countries' Hedging Strategy(Yaxuan Ji, 2025, Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Politics, Law, and Social Science)
绿色"一带一路"的实践形态、话语—实践落差与东道国社会—环境效应
这组文献考察中国绿色合作的具体落地载体与其阴影面:BRI 的动机与融资结构、能源投资以煤电与水电为主的历史偏好、绿色投资与环境规制的差异化效果、"一带一路、多条道路"式的项目异质性、水电边疆的地缘政治、互联互通作为经济理念的扩散,以及"说绿做褐"的话语—实践落差与由此引发的本地抗争。它们构成"风险感知"的供给侧来源,直接解释东道国为何在合作与戒备之间摆动。
- The Belt and Road Initiative: Motivations, financing, expansion and challenges of Xi’s ever-expanding strategy(Alex He, 2020, Journal of Infrastructure Policy and Development)
- China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia and its implications for ASEAN-China strategic partnership(M. Bharti, Suprabha Kumari, 2024, Asian Review of Political Economy)
- Environmental and Green Investment Regulations: The Impact of China's Belt and Green Road Initiative in Southeast Asia(Jing Zhang, Rizkan Zulyadi, M. C. Ramadhan, 2024, ARBITER: Jurnal Ilmiah Magister Hukum)
- One Belt, Many Roads: Investigating China’s foreign investment and land-use impacts in Southeast Asia(Xuewei Wang, Evan Johnson, D. Manya, Julia Cardwell, A. Hsu, 2025, PLOS Sustainability and Transformation)
- The making of a hydrofrontier: geopolitics, securitization and ‘green’ energy imaginaries in India's eastern borderlands(Michelle Irengbam, Chris Sneddon, 2025, Political Geography)
- Talking Green, Building Brown: China-ASEAN Environmental and Energy Cooperation in the BRI Era(Jessica C. Liao, 2022, Asian Perspective)
- Energy, Development and Protest: Assessing China's Official Finance in ASEAN's Power Sector(Robert Lindner, 2026, Asian Politics & Policy)
- Connectivity as an economic idea: A critical conceptual review of neoliberalism, Chinese Statecraft and ASEAN hedging in Southeast Asia(Sahara Putri Dahlan, 2026, Journal of Economic Epistemology and Philosophy)
安全化的触发机制:南海争端、灰色地带行动与"绿色—军事—矿产"联结的想象
这组分担"何时、由谁、以何话语把绿色与能源议题提升为安全问题"的触发侧解释:越南以平衡威胁理论解释其在南海压力下强化与菲、马、印尼的联合;印尼在北纳土纳海以技术与防御能力应对灰色地带行动;西方军事力量把气候与绿色转型框定为安全威胁并借冲突矿产维系"可保护/可牺牲"的全球分工。三者共同显示安全话语如何由领土—主权争端向资源与绿色产业链蔓延。
- Countering the Waves: Vietnam’s Bilateral Relations with the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia in the South China Sea(Cornelius Kim, 2025, Jurnal Impresi Indonesia)
- The Use of Technology as the Indonesia's Strategy to Counter China's Gray Zone Operations in the North Natuna Sea(Et al. Theo L Sambuaga, 2023, International Journal on Recent and Innovation Trends in Computing and Communication)
- Green Defence in the Racial‐Colonial Anthropocene: Militarized Twin Transitions and the Necropolitics of ‘Conflict‐Free’ Mineral Securitization in Eastern Congo(Ralph Tafon, 2026, Antipode)
国内政治经济机制(一):产业联盟、政商结构与中资投资的政治效应
这组文献把解释重心下沉到国内权力结构:印尼镍产业中放松管制、中国资本国际化与西方企业盈利压力叠加形成的对华经济相互依赖,以及保护中印尼合作方的新威权政治与新商业集团;澳—东南亚绿色产业合作中主导性经济—社会政治联盟如何落实或阻碍官方政策;中国投资是否助推东道国威权化,以及从中国传导至东道国的社会影响路径。它们与第二组共同构成"同一外部压力下政策为何分化"的核心解释变量。
- Understanding Indonesia's China Alignment in the Nickel Industry: The Entanglement of Economic Security and Capitalist Trajectories(Trissia Wijaya, 2026, Contemporary Southeast Asia)
- The new political economy of Australia—Southeast Asia engagement(G. Rodan, 2025, Australian Journal of International Affairs)
- Is Chinese Investment Driving Authoritarianism? Evidence from the First Decade of the Belt and Road in Southeast Asia(Neil Loughlin, 2025, Comparative politics)
- Social Impact Pathways from China to Southeast Asia: A Focused Study on Cambodia, the Philippines, and Thailand(K. Adams, 2026, IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science)
国内政治经济机制(二):绿色合作落地的吸收能力、投资风险与产业升级条件
这组文献关注"议程如何在东道国被吸收、扭曲或推进"的技术—治理条件:东道国国内因素对中国"绿色一带一路"项目成败的决定作用、绿色增长对外资区位选择的影响、中国可再生能源投资的国别风险结构、水—粮食—能源纽带视角下的绿色区域合作路径,以及摩洛哥从能源项目迈向绿色工业化的条件性经验。它们提供可操作的中间变量与跨国参照,与前一组(联盟与政商结构)在解释层次上相互区分。
- Domestic Factors on China’s Green Belt and Road Initiatives(Rizka Shafira, Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, 2025, Nation State: Journal of International Studies)
- How does green growth influence Chinese overseas investment in Southeast Asian nations? Insight from spatial analysis(N. Uttama, 2025, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies)
- Risk analysis of China's renewable energy cooperation with belt and road economies(Donghui Yu, Bai-He Gu, Kai-Wei Zhu, Jia-Wen Yang, Yu-Hui Sheng, 2024, Energy)
- Water-Food-Energy Nexus Approach: Towards Green Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia(B. Mitra, N. Pham, 2015, No journal)
- From Energy Projects Toward Green Industrialization: China–Morocco Energy Cooperation Under Geoeconomic Fragmentation(Zhi-Yi Lu, Samar Khamlichi, Yong-Hong Hong, 2026, Sustainability)
中小国家对冲战略:类型学、预期性对冲与东盟在美中竞争中的位置
这组文献提供战略行为层次的解释:对冲战略的内涵与类型学及其作为对不确定性回应的功能、东南亚国家选择"印太式对冲"的条件、以"未来学"方法处理预期性对冲的情景逻辑、东盟在美中竞争中的整体位置,以及东南亚对美中科技竞争的具体回应方式。它们把国内政治经济压力转译为可观察的政策谱系(轻—中—重对冲),是解释四国政策分化的行为层机制。
- Hedging Strategy as a Response to the United States-China Rivalry: The Case of Southeast Asia(P. Nedić, 2022, Review of International Affairs)
- Hedging with the Indo-Pacific: why Southeast Asia might benefit from embracing the construct(Gautam K. Rajesh, Madhumati Deshpande, 2025, The Round Table)
- Toward a futurist approach to hedging strategy in Southeast Asia: anticipations and strategic decision-making in a Taiwan contingency(P. Wong, 2025, Frontiers in Political Science)
- Navigating the US–China Rivalry: ASEAN's Position on Critical Mineral Resources(Xin-Lei Zhao, 2025, Pacific Focus)
- Southeast Asian Responses to U.S.-China Tech Competition: Hedging and Economy-Security Tradeoffs(Cheng-Chwee Kuik, 2024, Journal of Chinese Political Science)
国别经验基础:东南亚能源转型与印尼、越南、泰国、马来西亚的绿色产业形态
这组文献为四国分化提供可比较的经验底账:东南亚可再生能源法律政策与 uptake 的国别差异、可持续能源—环境关系的异质性评估、印尼以电动车与电池产业链吸引投资的产业化路径、日本 AZEC 等竞争性外部框架提供的替代选择空间、越南与菲马印尼的双边互动,以及生物燃料市场等细分领域的发展趋势。它们刻画各国绿色合作政策的实际形态与"可替代伙伴"结构。
- Renewable Energy in Southeast Asia(Jeong Woo, 2024, Journal of student-scientists' research)
- Assessing the Sustainability of Southeast Asia’s Energy Transition: A Comparative Analysis(F. Derouez, Adel Ifa, 2025, Energies)
- Indonesia's Movement to Become the Main Player in The Electric Vehicle (EV) Market in Southeast Asia(Bagus Budiono, A. Virgianita, 2024, Asian Journal of Engineering, Social and Health)
- AZEC as a new Japanese framework of regional cooperation: an assessment of the early developments (2023–2024)(O. B. Rameev, 2025, Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya 13. Vostokovedenie)
- Bilateral Cooperation between Vietnam and ASEAN Member States in 2010-2020: the Cases of Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines(V. Vershinina, 2020, South East Asia: Actual problems of Development)
- Analysis of biofuel market development trends in the context of cooperation between Russia and Southeast Asia countries(M. S. Petukhova, С. Phunsombat, 2025, Innovations and Food Safety)
区域制度、绿色金融与治理能力:去安全化的协调条件
这组文献关注"绿色合作能否被去安全化"的制度承载力:东盟气候治理的制度建设及其财政、人力与协调瓶颈;亚太多边机构(UN、IEA、IRENA、APEC、ADB、ASEAN)推动储能技术与治理框架的作用与日、泰、中模式差异;欧盟—中国—东盟绿色金融政策架构比较及对越南的启示;以及本领域研究议程对"国内因素塑造对华关系"的强调。它们把宏观机制落回可干预的制度与金融抓手。
- Constructing ASEAN cooperation on mitigating climate change(I. A. Satyawan, 2025, E3S Web of Conferences)
- Advancing Energy Storage Technologies and Governance in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Review of International Frameworks, Research Insights, and Regional Case Studies(Chung-Han Yang, Jack Huang, 2025, Energy Storage and Applications)
- Comparative analysis of green finance policies in the EU, China and ASEAN: Policy implications for Vietnam(Nghiêm Xuân Khoát, 2025, Journal of Forestry Science and Technology)
- Introduction to the special issue: changing dynamics in Southeast Asia-China relations(Ming-Jiang Li, 2025, The International Journal of Asian Studies)
比较视野:中国与俄罗斯、海湾、中亚、拉美绿色合作的驱动与约束
这组文献以中俄、中国—海湾、中亚"绿色丝路"与中拉合作为对照案例,提炼绿色合作的驱动力、阻力、标准互认与融资约束等一般性机制。它们为判断东南亚四国政策分化究竟源于区域特有因素(南海争端、东盟制度、国内联盟结构)还是中国绿色合作普遍逻辑(融资换资源、产能输出、标准本地化)提供比较基准与外部效度检验。
- Driving Forces, Constraints, and Optimization Pathways in China-Russia Green Cooperation(X. Guo, 2026, Economy of regions)
- Green Development Cooperation Between China and the Arab States of the Gulf: Challenges and Countermeasures(Ting Ma, 2024, Chinese and Arab Studies)
- Green Silk Road and Belt Economic Initiative and Local Sustainable Development: Through the Lens of China’s Clean Energy Investment in Central Asia(Shuqin Gao, Guy S. Liu, 2024, International Journal of Environment and Climate Change)
- A Study of China-Latin America Cooperation in Green Energy Industry: Status, Obstacles, and the Policy Suggestions(Bi Jing, 2024, International Journal of Sustainable Development and Planning)
合并后的66篇文献按"理论工具—外部结构—区域情境—中国供给—落地实践—安全化触发—国内机制—战略选择—国别经验—区域治理—跨区比较"的因果链条组织为13个并列分组。前三组奠定解释前提:相互依赖的非对称性与武器化/绿色脱钩(结构层)、安全泛化与技术管辖等安全化机制(机制层)、中美竞争与绿色技术标准之争构成的地区结构(约束层);第四组提供东南亚非传统安全与环境议题安全化的区域情境底色。第五至第七组处理"绿色相互依赖为何被安全化"的供给侧与触发侧:中国的能源安全诉求、绿色低碳战略与对东盟能源外交构成共同机会集;绿色"一带一路"的项目实践与"说绿做褐"落差塑造风险感知;南海争端、灰色地带行动与"绿色—军事—矿产"联结提供安全话语的触发点。第八、九组下沉到国内政治经济机制——产业联盟与政商结构(联盟与投资的政治效应)与吸收能力、投资风险、水—粮食—能源纽带(落地条件),二者共同构成四国政策分化的核心解释变量。第十组以对冲类型学与预期性对冲把国内压力转译为轻—中—重对冲的政策谱系;第十一组提供印尼、越南、泰国、马来西亚等国别能源转型与绿色产业(含 AZEC 等替代性外部框架)的经验底账;第十二组考察东盟制度与绿色金融治理能否承担"去安全化"的协调功能;第十三组以中俄、海湾、中亚、拉美案例作为比较基准,检验分化机制的普遍性与区域特殊性。整体形成"结构—机制—供给—触发—国内—战略—国别—治理—比较"的完整解释闭环,避免分组交叉重叠。
这组文献构成全报告最上层的理论前提:从"依赖还是相互依赖"的选择逻辑、复合相互依赖中的非对称权力、能源关系的武器化与制裁式经济胁迫,到绿色脱钩(geoeconomic interdependence 与 environmental regulation)如何将环境规制转化为地缘经济工具,再到全球金融集体安全与"从单极到碎片化"的秩序转型、霸权兴衰的长周期视角。它们共同回答"绿色相互依赖为何可以被转化为权力、又为何在秩序碎片化时代更容易被武器化",为四国政策分化提供结构性解释前提。相关文献:Viljar Veebel et. al, 2014 等 7 篇文献
这组文献把安全化从话语分析推进为可操作的机制理论:"国家安全泛化陷阱"解释经济议题被无差别安全化后的自我强化;技术出口的"管辖政治"说明技术标准与出口管制如何成为边界划定工具;"回应性安全化"刻画中国如何以经济治国术反向塑造他国的安全叙事;"被安全化的能源关系"与 TPP 的经济霸权分析则展示自贸协定与能源联结如何被卷入大国竞争。它们为"绿色相互依赖的安全化"提供概念装置与因果机制,与前一组(结构与非对称性)互补而不重叠。相关文献:Xiaoxiao Zeng et. al, 2025 等 5 篇文献
这组文献刻画四国制定对华绿色合作政策时所面对的地区结构性约束:美国对东盟的经济技术外交、美式"贸易—安全联结"路径、绿色技术作为竞争新领域与标准主导权之争、中美绿色能源合作的有限空间,以及东南亚在"解开复合相互依赖"进程中从受益者转为外溢风险承受者的处境。它们解释的是体系与区域层面的压力来源,而非任何单一国家的政策选择,因此与前两组理论文献形成"结构—机制"的分工。相关文献:K. Chudinova et. al, 2022 等 5 篇文献
这组文献把安全化理论落地到本区域的经验情境:环境议题(雾霾、水资源、气候)在东南亚被国家与社会行为体安全化的路径,"超越安全化"的非传统安全治理如何抑制或催生区域合作,以及东北亚可再生能源合作作为对照案例显示的制度化可能性。它们提供"安全化—合作"张力的区域底色,是解释四国威胁认知差异的情境前提,区别于第7组聚焦南海争端的触发机制。相关文献:Apriwan Apriwan et. al, 2015 等 3 篇文献
这组文献聚焦分化的"供给侧自变量":中国能源安全关切如何塑造其周边外交与对外能源行为、亚洲能源安全前景的地区含义、绿色低碳政策体系与能源战略的"软转向"、对东南亚的能源外交工具箱,以及中国—东盟绿色发展合作与中菲/中国与东南亚关系的具体制度安排。它们回答"中国为何以及以何种政策工具向东南亚输出绿色合作议程",是解释四国面对的共同"机会集"。相关文献:Khanh Quoc Vuong et. al, 2026 等 7 篇文献
这组文献考察中国绿色合作的具体落地载体与其阴影面:BRI 的动机与融资结构、能源投资以煤电与水电为主的历史偏好、绿色投资与环境规制的差异化效果、"一带一路、多条道路"式的项目异质性、水电边疆的地缘政治、互联互通作为经济理念的扩散,以及"说绿做褐"的话语—实践落差与由此引发的本地抗争。它们构成"风险感知"的供给侧来源,直接解释东道国为何在合作与戒备之间摆动。相关文献:Alex He et. al, 2020 等 8 篇文献
这组分担"何时、由谁、以何话语把绿色与能源议题提升为安全问题"的触发侧解释:越南以平衡威胁理论解释其在南海压力下强化与菲、马、印尼的联合;印尼在北纳土纳海以技术与防御能力应对灰色地带行动;西方军事力量把气候与绿色转型框定为安全威胁并借冲突矿产维系"可保护/可牺牲"的全球分工。三者共同显示安全话语如何由领土—主权争端向资源与绿色产业链蔓延。相关文献:Cornelius Kim et. al, 2025 等 3 篇文献
这组文献把解释重心下沉到国内权力结构:印尼镍产业中放松管制、中国资本国际化与西方企业盈利压力叠加形成的对华经济相互依赖,以及保护中印尼合作方的新威权政治与新商业集团;澳—东南亚绿色产业合作中主导性经济—社会政治联盟如何落实或阻碍官方政策;中国投资是否助推东道国威权化,以及从中国传导至东道国的社会影响路径。它们与第二组共同构成"同一外部压力下政策为何分化"的核心解释变量。相关文献:Trissia Wijaya et. al, 2026 等 4 篇文献
这组文献关注"议程如何在东道国被吸收、扭曲或推进"的技术—治理条件:东道国国内因素对中国"绿色一带一路"项目成败的决定作用、绿色增长对外资区位选择的影响、中国可再生能源投资的国别风险结构、水—粮食—能源纽带视角下的绿色区域合作路径,以及摩洛哥从能源项目迈向绿色工业化的条件性经验。它们提供可操作的中间变量与跨国参照,与前一组(联盟与政商结构)在解释层次上相互区分。相关文献:Rizka Shafira et. al, 2025 等 5 篇文献
这组文献提供战略行为层次的解释:对冲战略的内涵与类型学及其作为对不确定性回应的功能、东南亚国家选择"印太式对冲"的条件、以"未来学"方法处理预期性对冲的情景逻辑、东盟在美中竞争中的整体位置,以及东南亚对美中科技竞争的具体回应方式。它们把国内政治经济压力转译为可观察的政策谱系(轻—中—重对冲),是解释四国政策分化的行为层机制。相关文献:P. Nedić et. al, 2022 等 5 篇文献
这组文献为四国分化提供可比较的经验底账:东南亚可再生能源法律政策与 uptake 的国别差异、可持续能源—环境关系的异质性评估、印尼以电动车与电池产业链吸引投资的产业化路径、日本 AZEC 等竞争性外部框架提供的替代选择空间、越南与菲马印尼的双边互动,以及生物燃料市场等细分领域的发展趋势。它们刻画各国绿色合作政策的实际形态与"可替代伙伴"结构。相关文献:Jeong Woo et. al, 2024 等 6 篇文献
这组文献关注"绿色合作能否被去安全化"的制度承载力:东盟气候治理的制度建设及其财政、人力与协调瓶颈;亚太多边机构(UN、IEA、IRENA、APEC、ADB、ASEAN)推动储能技术与治理框架的作用与日、泰、中模式差异;欧盟—中国—东盟绿色金融政策架构比较及对越南的启示;以及本领域研究议程对"国内因素塑造对华关系"的强调。它们把宏观机制落回可干预的制度与金融抓手。相关文献:I. A. Satyawan et. al, 2025 等 4 篇文献
这组文献以中俄、中国—海湾、中亚"绿色丝路"与中拉合作为对照案例,提炼绿色合作的驱动力、阻力、标准互认与融资约束等一般性机制。它们为判断东南亚四国政策分化究竟源于区域特有因素(南海争端、东盟制度、国内联盟结构)还是中国绿色合作普遍逻辑(融资换资源、产能输出、标准本地化)提供比较基准与外部效度检验。相关文献:X. Guo et. al, 2026 等 4 篇文献
总计 66 篇相关文献
The Green Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China's international development strategy, aims to improve regional connectivity while addressing the environmental challenges of major infrastructure projects. This study explores the impact of BRI on environmental regulations and green investment in Southeast Asia, given the importance of sustainable development in the global economy. Research methods include document analysis, project reports, academic literature, and interviews with stakeholders, as well as case studies. The results show that BRI is driving the transformation of environmental regulations in countries such as Viet Nam, Indonesia, and Thailand, and facilitating the shift towards green investment. Investments in renewable energy, sustainable urban planning, and green technology are growing. Despite challenges such as high costs and alignment of interests, BRI opens up opportunities for international cooperation and green market development. This research emphasizes the need for a multifaceted approach to balance economic growth and environmental protection.
ABSTRACT Amidst intensifying great power rivalry between the US and China, the Australian government has looked to greater cooperation with Southeast Asian countries to navigate a peaceful and prosperous course through the rough seas of this second Cold War. This is an understandable but also problematic direction. Economic and security imperatives have long been intertwined. The challenge now, however, is to understand how so in the new political economy of militarised neoliberalism, and the implications for regional engagement. Otherwise, policy plans have shaky foundations. This argument is prosecuted with an illustrative focus on policies of joint Australia and Southeast Asia cooperation in ‘green’ industries, most advanced with Indonesia. Political economy research reveals how policies of cooperation meant to avoid taking sides in superpower contestation can have starkly different outcomes. Identifying and analysing dominant coalitions of economic and socio-political interest, mediating how official policy is implemented or obstructed, is pivotal to understanding the constraints and possibilities of effective cooperation.
Indonesia's Movement to Become the Main Player in The Electric Vehicle (EV) Market in Southeast Asia
This article discusses Indonesia's position in the electric vehicle market with a focus on investment from multinational companies such as Hyundai. Globalization plays an important role in the development of the electric vehicle industry, with the aim of reducing pollution and exhaust emissions. Multinational companies are often involved in the production of environmentally friendly vehicles as part of efforts towards a green economy. Through descriptive qualitative research methods, this research describes the relationship between state policies and the behavior of investment actors in the phenomenon of global capitalism in globalization and its impact on the electric vehicle market in Indonesia. With investment from multinational companies, Indonesia is expected to become the leading electric car battery producer in ASEAN. The steps and strategies for cooperation between Indonesia and Hyundai in developing the electric car battery industry are also discussed in this article.
The Southeast Asian region provides a good test bed to examine how non-traditional security (NTS) issues have been governed. Over the past two decades, the region had experienced a number of crises that have had significant impact on the security agenda of states and the nature of multilateral security and development cooperation that have evolved within and beyond Southeast Asia. Among the most consequential crises that have occurred were the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the health emergencies caused by SARS epidemic in 2003 and H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza in 2005, the catastrophic devastations brought on by large-scale natural disasters like Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, the multi-faceted impact of the transboundary haze in 2015 and the escalation of the Rohingya refugee issue in 2017. While these security problems are typically non-military in nature, they are referred to as NTS issues since they are found to gravely threaten the
Since the beginning of the 21st century, economic globalization has increased, intensifying geopolitical compe-tition and making economics an important instrument of strategic rivalry between states. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), as an agreement between Asia-Pacific countries, has been used by the United States to strengthen its influence over trade rules in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) region, as well as to control its allies and promote the concept of “economic securitization”. This article examines how the United States uses the Trans-Pacific Partnership to expand its influence and analyzes the impact of this association on China and the Asso-ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) using critical discourse analysis and regional security complex theory. Analysis of the materials of official publications and American media, in which America’s position is supported lexically and semantically in the communicative space, is presented. Conclusion dwells upon the fact that the sustainability of the future economic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region will depend on the abil-ity of regional players to find a balance between competition and cooperation, avoiding excessive politicization of economic issues.
No abstract available
ABSTRACT Currently, the green economy plays a significant role in embracing global economic activities and advancing sustainable economic development. This study examines the effect of green growth on Chinese direct investment in ten Southeast Asian countries from 2010 to 2020. Using spatial panel data and a spatial Durbin model, the analysis reveals that green growth determinants significantly influence China’s outward investment. Specifically, efficient and sustainable resource use, green economic opportunities, and social inclusion in Southeast Asian countries attract Chinese investment, while strong natural capital protection tends to deter it. Identifying the spatial effect, social inclusion in neighboring countries also positively affects investment flows. These findings have policy implications for improving the green economy and fostering regional green growth cooperation.
Abstract:This article examines the evolution of China-ASEAN environmental and energy cooperation since the 2010s with a focus on changes following the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It shows that over the past decade China and ASEAN have actively expanded cooperative frameworks and mechanisms in the domain of environmental protection as part of their comprehensive approach to sustainable development, particularly regarding energy projects. Nonetheless, the implementation record in their energy cooperation, that is, the lion’s share of BRI projects in Southeast Asia, remains unsustainable and contradicts with their shared “green” policy discourse. The article examines factors from both sides of China and ASEAN that contribute to this disconnect and explains why China’s own accomplishments in renewable energy development fail to spill over to Southeast Asia. These findings have implications for China’s impact on global governance and its leadership role in the Global South.
This paper examines how the environmental issues have been securitized in Southeast Asia. It takes three main issues which are atmosphere pollution and deforestation, water resources, and energy resources. The issues could be a potential conflict that will impact to the regional instability. In order to examine the securitization, it uses constructivism approach and securitization concept. This approach and the concept explain about the response and the action of the states, individual or collective related to that issues. The environmental issues have been emerging conflict among the states which got the impact. For the atmospher pollution and deforestation, Malaysia and Singapore got a tension with Indonesia as the source of problems. On the case of water crisis occured between Malaysia and Singapore in using water resource from Johor, the same cases also happened among the riparian states with China in using the Mekong River Basin. The complicated conflicts about using energy resources have been happening in South China Sea, Thailand’s Gulf and the Ambalat. On the other hand, the state’s response also could make a cooperation among them, which are billateral, multillateral and regional. Thus, securitization of the environmental issues can be seen on how the states give a perception to the issues within an interaction of social structure. Moreover, the states are seen as social actors which interacted within the context of sharing of knowledge, understanding of material resources and the practice of interaction among the states its self.
Southeast Asia is one of the world's most vulnerable regions to the impacts of climate change, including floods, droughts, typhoons, sea-level rise, and heat waves. This situation is exacerbated by high urbanization, deforestation, and pollution. Through ASEAN Vision 2045, member countries agreed to strengthen cooperation and be responsive to eradicate the impacts of climate change, environmental degradation, biodiversity loss, and lead the transition to a green and blue economy. Through constructivism lens and qualitative methods, the objective of this article provides an evaluation of institutional building for cooperation in mitigating climate change. The results of this study indicate that although the commitment of various institutions to cooperation is quite high, it has not yet shown maximum results due to several obstacles, including financial issues, human resource capacity, and coordination. Consequently, ASEAN must improve its rapid decision-making mechanisms and increase its members' capacity building in countering the impacts of climate change.
The Asia Zero Emission Community (AZEC), launched by Japan in 2022, represents a new platform for regional cooperation in the fields of decarbonization and green energy. The article examines the key parameters of AZEC’s formation, its institutional characteristics, and the preliminary results of its implementation in 2023-2024. At this stage, AZEC functions as a flexible coordination framework without a strict international legal basis, which allows adaptation to diverse national contexts but simultaneously creates risks of limited long-term sustainability. Particular attention is given to the analysis of projects implemented in Southeast Asian countries and Australia, including hydrogen and ammonia technologies, biomass power generation, microgrids, and energy management systems. Case studies from Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and other participants highlight the multi-level nature of cooperation, encompassing energy, industry, and the agricultural sector. Despite its modest quantitative impact (approximately 0.0785% of the region’s total installed capacity by the end of 2024), the initiative’s qualitative significance lies in piloting innovative technologies, shaping the institutional foundations of climate policy, and strengthening a regional “ecosystem” structured around Japanese technological solutions. At this stage, AZEC functions primarily as a mechanism for demonstrating and testing models of low-carbon development, as well as a channel for the transfer of norms, knowledge, and governance practices. Its contribution to the energy transition in East Asia is therefore less about immediate capacity expansion and more about creating the conditions for future scaling of Japan’s energy sector in the region and deepening of green cooperation.
Abstract Over the past several decades, sustained economic growth has led to a surge in energy consumption in Northeast Asia, most notably, in China, Japan and South Korea. However, domestic supply has failed to meet the demand in energy, leading to two related outcomes: First, the widening gap between production and consumption has led to dependency on external sources of energy. Second, it has forced the governments to securitize their energy policy. Nevertheless, unlike other regions such as the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, energy dependency in Northeast Asia has not encouraged closer intra-regional cooperation. Rather, in some instances, it has undermined cooperation and exacerbated unconstructive competition. Thus, in this study, our aim is to highlight the problematic relationship between energy securitization and regional energy cooperation in Northeast Asia, and provide an analysis on the rationale, mechanisms and challenges for energy-driven regional cooperation. We, in this respect, argue that, drawing on the existing regional compatibilities in renewable energy generation and consumption patterns, establishing a multi-modal integration and communication mechanism would promote greater integration and help bridge the gap between securitization and cooperation in energy in Northeast Asia.
China’s implementation of the Green Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) reflects a shift in its foreign policy to support global energy transition and sustainable development. However, there is a notable gap between the initiative’s objectives and its outcomes in host countries. While the Green BRI aims to showcase China’s commitment to green investments, its energy investments in Indonesia remain heavily focused on fossil fuels, particularly coal. In contrast, China’s renewable energy investments are prominent in Thailand. This study examines the implementation of the Green BRI in Indonesia and Thailand, analyzing how the energy mixes and investment portfolios. This study involving literature review and analysis of secondary data sources analyzed through the lens of Global China. This study argues that the divergence in Green BRI implementation across Southeast Asia reflects not merely China’s flexibility, but the differentiated capacities of host countries to absorb, steer, or resist foreign investment agendas. Ultimately, Green BRI is highly adaptive, and its outcomes are co-produced through complex interactions between China’s intentions and the domestic landscapes of partner countries. This study contributes by highlighting the critical role of domestic political and economic contexts in shaping China’s green investments.
Abstract:Industrial policy is back, driven by a global scramble for energy transition minerals (ETMs), green technologies and intensifying geopolitical rivalry. Resource-rich states have sought to leverage the ETM boom to gain greater control over supply chains and bolster economic security. Despite being the world's largest nickel producer and despite determined efforts to diversify its partners and build a domestically rooted electric vehicles ecosystem, Indonesia has seen a growing Chinese dominance over its nickel industry. Why has this happened, and what has driven Jakarta's closer alignment with Beijing? This article approaches the puzzle through the lens of uneven and combined development (UCD), arguing that both the path of Chinese investment and Indonesia's strategic choices are products of intertwined, co-evolving trajectories of capitalist development and the relational character of state power. This has been sustained by three combinatorial socio-political dynamics. First, deregulation in Indonesia's nickel refining sector, the internationalization of Chinese capital in the "New Three" sectors and profitability pressures affecting key Western players have tightened Indonesia-China economic interdependence. Second, the emergence of a new form of authoritarian politics that safeguards conditions for Chinese companies while simultaneously protecting their Indonesian partners. Finally, new business groups have emerged, centred on Indonesia's key state-owned enterprises, whose operations and growth strategies are closely tied to Chinese companies.
Southeast Asia's economic growth demands substantial energy investment. This study investigates China's official financing for power generation in the ASEAN region since 2000 through a systematic mapping approach. Findings show that China has primarily supported coal and hydropower projects, especially in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Laos, while offering minimal renewable energy financing. This is mainly attributed to unfavorable local policy environments and China's focus on large‐scale infrastructure. The study also highlights widespread local resistance—particularly to coal projects—driven by environmental and livelihood concerns. The forms of mobilization were shaped by the political freedom in each country. While official Chinese coal financing largely ceased after 2019, aligning with Beijing's international climate commitments, questions remain about the enforcement of this pledge and the broader shift toward green energy. The study concludes by examining the structural and political barriers that have historically favored fossil fuel investments over renewables in the region.
The paper examines the motivations, financing, expansion and challenges of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI was initially designed to address China’s overcapacity and promote economic growth in both China and in countries along the “Belt” and “Road” through infrastructure investment and industrial capacity cooperation. It took into account China’s strategic transition in its opening-up policy and foreign policy to pay more attention to the neighboring countries in Southeast Asia and Central and West Asia when facing greater strategic pressure from the United States in East Asia and the Pacific region. More themes have been added to the initiative’s original framework since its inception in 2013, including the vision of the BRI as China’s major solution to improve international economic cooperation and practice to build a “community of shared future for mankind”, and the idea of the Green Silk Road and the Digital Silk Road. Chinese state-owned enterprises and policy and commercial banks have dominated investment and financing for BRI projects, which explains the root of the problems and risks facing the initiative, such as unsustainable debt, non-transparency, corruption and low economic efficiency. Measures taken by China to tackle these problems, for example, mitigating the debt distress and improving debt sustainability, are unlikely to make a big difference anytime soon due to the tenacity of China’s long-held state-driven investment model.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can reshape landscapes in developing countries, but its impact remains unclear. This study examines how China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) FDI impacts land-cover and land-use change in Southeast Asia, a key trade partner receiving significant Chinese infrastructure investments. Focusing on areas with BRI investments from 2008 to 2018, we utilize satellite data to analyze land-use changes across Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam), particularly urban growth and deforestation. We find that districts that received BRI investment experienced nearly a 5% greater rate of deforestation than the regional average, with a 0.007% decrease in tree cover associated with every 1% increase in Chinese investment. Districts receiving investments also showed greater increases in cropland and grasslands. While statistical tests indicate the immediate land-cover changes are modest, our findings suggest potential future environmental consequences in Southeast Asia, particularly with ongoing economic development.
No abstract available
This article investigates the impact of Chinese investment on authoritarianism through the lens of authoritarian linkage, focusing on the first decade of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia and Malaysia. While both countries were electoral autocracies when the BRI was launched in 2013, their regime trajectories diverged. In Cambodia, Chinese investment reinforced elite patronage networks and coercive state-society relations, stabilizing the regime during political unrest. Conversely, in Malaysia, it contributed to the collapse of the long-ruling authoritarian coalition by exacerbating elite fragmentation and popular discontent over corruption, which has led to greater political competition. These findings demonstrate how domestic political economy dynamics mediate the effects of Chinese investment, revealing its variable influence on regime outcomes.
This paper examines how China’s renewable energy investment contributes to the Central Asian countries’ GHG emission reduction target to meet their global climate commitments and the United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs2030). The introduction analyzes what problems have emerged in China’s Green Silk Road and Belt Economic Initiative (SRBI) and how global climate change is viewed to affect sustainable energy transition in the Central Asian countries. The paper will then focus on what response in national energy structures have been adopted by Central Asian countries to address global climate change commitments. The main focus of this paper is on how China’s renewable energy investment in Central Asia contributes to solving essential problems for sustainable energy transition, bridging technical gaps and financial barriers for the low-carbon sustainable energy transition and aligning with the Paris agreement to fulfill global climate commitments. The limited institutional capacity and market failure in renewable policy ecosystems in Central Asian countries jeopardizes domestic climate investment and China’s renewable investment potential, increasing national spending for sustainable development transition and triggering huge fiscal deficit and debt crises. This endogenous systemic risk deteriorates financial and technical barriers. This requires regional and multilateral renewables coordination and climate cooperation. China needs to set up a comprehensive green policy for the Central Asian countries to get full support from local and international society. PPP and multilateral cooperation in the international renewables investment have not only mobilized more climate financial resources but also mitigate and diversify market failure risk.
Systematic weaponization of economic interdependence in the form of sanctions, financial statecraft, export controls, supply chain securitization is fostering the fragmentation of the global economic order. This paper posits that the coercive leverage as exposed in the use of unprecedented measures has spurred active fragmentation best qualified by strategic diversification away from dollar reserves, by utilization of parallel payment systems, by friendshored industrial ecosystems and by an alternative trade corridor. Rather than power being further consolidated behind the sender, instead agency is redistributed back to “swing states” that are skilled at hedging between the blocs, and to hit states who develop advanced practices of evasion and capacity for withstanding consequences. The subsequent multiplication of centers creates systemic susceptibility to cascading shocks, and hinders collective responses to climate and pandemics, as well as embeds inflationary dysfunctions. The more assertive resistance of the Global South to extraterritorial coercion, and demand for governance reform, also modifies the terrain of struggle. The weaponization wager trades group stability for relative power, requiring statecraft focused on mutual dialogue and moderation to manage common planetary dangers.
EU-China relations are increasingly defined by securitization. This paper examines how the logic of economic statecraft and securitization shapes the relationship between the European Union and China. It shows how China’s use of economic instruments to pursue national security goals has prompted a political and institutional response in the EU. The EU’s approach has shifted toward risk reduction, with greater focus on strategic dependencies and economic security. Using the concepts of securitization and economic statecraft, the paper argues that recent EU policy changes reflect a broader trend of mutual securitization in a relationship marked by interdependence and strategic rivalry.
Abstract:The predominant approach to economic security in Southeast Asia has long centred on the security of the state and ruling regime, which in turn has been broadly interpreted to include economic development as a primary source of regime legitimation. The escalation of geopolitical risk and a sharp shift in US trade policies now challenge the region's economic security strategies. Initially, Southeast Asia benefitted economically from trade and technology competition between the United States and China from 2018, as moves to unwind the structures of complex interdependence linking the two economies resulted in diversion of investment and trade in favour of the region. However, the region has, as a result, become more vulnerable to spillovers arising from the securitization of trade and economic policy by major powers, and particularly since 2025, has been the target of coercive and erratic trade policies adopted by the United States. The environment in which Southeast Asian ruling regimes pursue economic security is thus undergoing a structural shift, as trade and investment patterns are disrupted.
No abstract available
The U.S.-China relationship has undergone a profound transformation since the onset of the trade war in 2018. Once defined by mutual economic interdependence, bilateral cooperation has increasingly been supplanted by a pervasive logic of “national security.” This paper investigates the phenomenon of “security over-expansion” — the strategic inflation of national security discourse into economic and technological realms — as a central dynamic in contemporary U.S.-China strategic competition. Through a dual-theoretical lens of securitization theory and institutionalization theory, the paper analyzes how both nations reframe non-security issues such as technology, investment, and supply chains into matters of national security. The study reveals that this securitization trend structurally erodes international trust, fragments global governance regimes, and fosters a new form of institutionalized confrontation. It concludes with a call to re-establish normative boundaries for security claims to safeguard global institutional integrity.
How does the securitization of economic interdependence alter the geographical and jurisdictional organization of corporate knowledge? Existing work on weaponized interdependence explains how states exploit central positions in global networks, while research on technological sovereignty anticipates greater nationalization and bloc formation. These perspectives frequently treat a firm' s international knowledge system as a single object that becomes either more global or more national. This article instead distinguishes three layers: the location of inventive labor, the geography of co-invention, and the jurisdiction of codified knowledge referenced in patent applications. Using an outcome-independent roster of 50 Chinese corporate groups designated on the United States Entity List, this article links 22 groups to U.S. patent applications and compares event years −5 to −1 with +1 to +3, reserving year 0 as a transition period. The analysis reveals a theoretically consequential configuration. China–U.S. co-invention declines under three aggregation designs, China–third-country co-invention rises, and the applicant-cited knowledge base shifts consistently from U.S.-authority toward Chinese-authority documents. In contrast, aggregate U.S. and third-country inventor presence varies with weighting and sample composition. The findings identify layered alignment, whereby national reorientation in codified knowledge can coexist with continued transnational production of knowledge and selective third-country connectivity.
The crisis of the unipolar model, driven by its inherent dysfunctions (rule asymmetry, securitization of financial infrastructure, social costs of neoliberal policies), has triggered the fragmentation of global economic relations. Through critical and institutional analysis, this article argues that the rise of new power centers and the global energy transition act not merely as catalysts for change but as sources of fundamentally new – horizontal – dilemmas: institutional (pluralism vs. bloc fragmentation), regulatory (climate cooperation vs. green protectionism), temporal (short-term political cycles vs. long-term strategic resilience), and legitimation (internal contradictions of the energy transition, including social resistance and technological externalities). The study demonstrates that the emerging contours of a hypothesized “Globalization 2.0” are shaped not by declaratory principles (such as managed interdependence or climate mainstreaming), but by the capacity of key actors – states, corporations, and institutions – to ensure the interoperability of competing technical, regulatory, and financial standards. Drawing on empirical data on tariff asymmetries, supply chain vulnerabilities, and the uneven impact of carbon border mechanisms, the article reveals a self-reinforcing cycle of fragmentation. It concludes that failure to resolve the identified horizontal dilemmas through hybrid strategies and interoperable platforms will lead not to a stable polycentric order, but to the reproduction of unipolar dysfunctions in a more acute and conflict-ridden form of bloc-based fragmentation.
This article examines how domestic political dynamics and regional geopolitical considerations influenced the rise and fall of Australia's short-lived Agricultural Visa (AAV) program aimed at recruiting workers from ASEAN countries. Employing a qualitative case study approach and drawing on neoliberal economic theory, securitization theory, and complex interdependence theory, the analysis reveals key tensions. The AAV's genesis reflected neoliberal narratives of filling labor shortages, but its demise exemplified concerns over worker exploitation and adverse impacts on local labor standards. The visa also became entangled in Australia's strategic rivalry with China in the Pacific, with labor migration becoming a securitized issue. Crucially, the case exposes challenges of policy coherence, as actions in the security domain strained Australia's ASEAN relationships. The findings underscore the need for holistic approaches balancing economic needs, worker rights, regional diplomacy, and evolving security dynamics when crafting labor migration policies amidst complex global interdependencies. The AAV's failure serves as a cautionary tale about piecemeal, politically expedient migration strategies disconnected from on-the-ground realities.
A Choice between Dependence and Interdependence: The Baltic States in Quest for Peace and Prosperity
Interdependence is a political and institutional tool, which can work either in favor of or against the needs of small member states in the international organisations. The European model of co-operation based on economic interdependence and integration has been the indisputable success for the last half of a century. At the same time, interdependence does not solely offer opportunities, but also entails risks. Theoretically, the weakness of the securitization based on the interdependence is related to the situation where some member states receive more gains from the interdependence than others, but feel less motivated to pay the costs associated to security. In this case, interdependence can also create security illusion and make some member states in the community be less careful and responsible both in terms of economic and military security. For small states the needs and threats are different than for bigger member states in the core. High economic openness and vulnerability to external shocks, dependence from the external capital flows leaves them less options for long-term stability. This study aims to analyse the relationship between the inter¬dependence, security and wel¬fare, discussing whether interdependence should be considered as a simple, linear mechanism which increases the security and welfare of all participants, or it also involves risks related both to economic and security aspects, which should be evaluated before applying for a membership in the international organisations. Are the security and prosperity gains expected from interdependence and integration real or rather an “illusion” what small states would like to believe in and big states are happy to promote?
The subject of energy security in the international arena came to the platform with the increasing economic and globalization development in the framework that is called the 'untraditional security'. In today’s international relations, Energy security and security issues appear to be extremely intertwined. Hence, this paper aims to identify the significance of securitization of the energy relationship between Russia and EU countries by both sides and its influence on the Energy Security on the regional security complex between EU countries and Russia. The current study argues that, regardless of the magnitude of the energy relationship, which manifests itself in a high degree of interdependence between the two sides, their relationship saw dispute, because of a high level of securitization process initiated by both EU member states and Russia.
The uncertainty surrounding the global economic turmoil is placing both states and alliances under significant stress to re-organize by streamlining costs and minimizing the impact of the crisis on publics, capabilities and future growth prospects. This paper is rather expansive in the ground it covers, and it is divided into several sections. In the beginning, there is a discussion of the importance of global finance and an overview of the current system, along with some of the existing measures and challenges to managing the level of risk. I use the ChinaAmerica relationship as a real-world reference to the deep connections that already exist between finance and security, and as manifested into one of the fundamental relationships of the international system. The next major section presents the perspectives of securitization and complex interdependence theories in an attempt to call for the need of a synthesis that will allow for predicting and internalizing the risks that global finance poses to collective security; implications are drawn immediately after. The final important component of the paper presents a discussion of the normative and practical measures that existing security alliances need to adopt and emerging ones have to embrace, in order to stay viable and relevant; before I conclude, a consideration of potential reforms for NATO shows how such normative considerations might turn out in practice.
A comprehensive analysis of the current state and prospects of biofuel market development in Russia and Asian countries has been carried out. Against the background of global changes in the energy sector and increasing demand for renewable energy sources, Asian countries are actively developing the biofuel sector, considering it an important component of sustainable economic growth and reducing dependence on fossil fuels. Key market trends, growth drivers, and major challenges faced by the biofuels industry are examined. A comparative analysis of the biofuels market in Asian countries including China, Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia shows high interest in biofuels as an alternative energy source. In 2022, Asia’s share of global biofuel imports was more than 60%, with Indonesia and Malaysia being the major suppliers, focusing on biodiesel production from palm oil. China, seeking to reduce its dependence on fossil fuel imports, is actively developing bioethanol production using agricultural waste. China has emerged as one of the leading bioethanol producers in the region in 2023. Japan and South Korea are focusing on biodiesel from cooking oil waste, which highlights these countries’ focus on sustainable production and waste minimization. Factors contributing to the development of the biofuels market are identified: economic and environmental incentives, technological innovations, and infrastructural improvements. It is shown that Russia in the future can become one of the key suppliers of biofuels to Asian countries, expanding its own export structure, which, in turn, will increase the foreign trade revenues of our country. Joint projects aimed at the development of infrastructure, transportation networks and processing facilities contribute to the formation of a single biofuel market between Russia and Asian countries, which facilitates trade and stimulates economic interaction.
China’s increasing engagement with Southeast Asia represents a significant political and developmental trend in the twenty-first century. This study analyzes how China’s effort toward development strategies, bilateral cooperation frameworks, and civil society initiatives generates a measurable social impact in Cambodia, the Philippines, and Thailand, with a focus on education, medical health, and sustainable development. By employing policy analysis, case studies, and secondary literature, the research examines Chinese-funded friendship schools, educational training programs, medical team deployments, and cleanenergy investments in the Southeast Asia region. The findings indicate that Chinese engagement has enhanced access to education, healthcare, and renewable energy, although outcomes differ by country and are influenced by local governance, absorptive capacity, and stakeholder participation. The study contends that transitioning from donor-centric to partnership-centric models anchored in community ownership, transparency, and longterm capacity building is essential for a prosperous and sustainable impact. Policy recommendations are offered for governments, multilateral organizations, and civil society. Background: China’s impact in the ASEAN region has proven to be important for a social impact during the last twenty years. During that timeframe, China’s presence in Cambodia, the Philippines, and Thailand has proven to be beneficial in the focused areas of education, medical health, and sustainability. With China’s investments in these three particular countries, it is necessary to understand how a positive impact will be favorable to Southeast Asia in the future. Materials and Methods: The research applied a mixed method analysis using qualitative and quantitative approaches for a comparative case study design. Data was collected through a systematic review of secondary literature, including peer-reviewed journal articles, policy documents, reports from international organizations, and investigative journals. Case studies were selected to represent the three analytical domains—education, health, and sustainable development—and to capture variation across the three focused countries. Quantitative data on enrollment rates, health outcomes, and energy capacity were incorporated to deliver empirical grounding for qualitative claims. The study did not rely on primary fieldwork and all findings are therefore interpreted with appropriate attention to the limitations of secondary data sources. Results: The findings of this research determined that Chinese cooperation has created significant benefits in education, improved health service, and progress toward clean energy transitions. However, the sustainability and equity of these benefits are frequently constrained by structural factors, including weak local governance capacity, insufficient transparency, limited capacity building, and cultural insensitivity. Conclusion: The analysis established that the social impact of China’s engagement with Cambodia, the Philippines, and Thailand across three domains: education, medical health, and sustainable development, are extremely beneficial to Southeast Asia. For future improvements, by strengthening the governance frameworks that regulate Chinese cooperation programs, ensuring that agreements are transparent, and confirming that community concerns are systematically incorporated will assist for a better tomorrow with China’s investments in the ASEAN region.
This review explores the development of energy storage technologies and governance frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region, where rapid economic growth and urbanisation drive the demand for sustainable energy solutions. Energy storage systems (ESS) are integral to balancing renewable energy fluctuations, improving grid resilience, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This paper examines the role of international organisations, including the United Nations, International Energy Agency (IEA), and International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), in promoting energy storage advancements through strategic initiatives, policy frameworks, and funding mechanisms. Regionally, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have launched programs fostering collaboration, technical support, and knowledge sharing. Detailed case studies of Japan, Thailand, and China highlight the diverse policy approaches, technological innovations, and international collaborations shaping energy storage advancements. While Japan emphasises cutting-edge innovation, Thailand focuses on regional integration, and China leads in large-scale deployment and manufacturing. This analysis identifies key lessons from these frameworks and case studies, providing insights into governance strategies, policy implications, and the challenges of scaling energy storage technologies. It offers a roadmap for advancing regional and global efforts toward achieving low-carbon, resilient energy systems aligned with sustainability and climate goals.
No abstract available
Cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is one of the important elements of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The United States plans to expand its participation and capital investment in infrastructure building in the region, in renewable energy sources and in new technologies development, especially digital commerce. However, since the United States is not a member of neither the CPTTP nor the RCEP, US companies may be at a disadvantage compared to those from other countries. At the same time, ASEAN economies are actively cooperating with the PRC, including cooperation within the framework of the Belt and Road and the Digital Silk Road project. One of the most important tasks of US economic diplomacy in the Asia Pacific is to create with allied countries a system of technological standards, as an alternative to the one lobbied by China. The changing situation in the region provides many new opportunities for Russian enterprises. For example, Russian companies have the potential to cooperate with the ASEAN economies in the production and trade of science-intensive products.
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This study aims to discuss China’s bilateral partnership with Southeast Asia under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s BRI framework of cooperation serves as a platform for enhancing economic, cultural, tourism, and trade relationships with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, promoting regional development and cooperation. China’s BRI cooperation framework comprehensively defines “Globalization 5.0” and this research speaks rationally about the theory of power transition. As a result, BRI projects not only benefit Southeast Asian countries by improving infrastructure and economic growth but also contribute to China’s strategic goal of expanding its influence in the region through connectivity and cooperation. The BRI has been instrumental in developing large-scale infrastructure projects across Southeast Asia, including railways, ports, highways, and energy projects. The China-Laos Railway, which connects Vientiane with Kunming, is a notable example, promoting regional connectivity and trade. Similarly, the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway in Indonesia is another high-profile project aimed at enhancing transportation efficiency. In addition to economic and infrastructure projects, the BRI has enhanced cultural ties between China and Southeast Asia. This includes educational exchanges, joint research initiatives, and people-to-people exchanges, fostering stronger mutual understanding and cooperation. Collaborative cultural programs and tourism initiatives have been promoted to strengthen these ties.
Abstract: Renewable energy sources, such as solar, wind, and hydropower, offer great promise in the fight against climate change. The use of these clean energy sources can significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help mitigate the impacts of global warming. One of the biggest advantages of renewable energy is that it is sustainable and does not deplete natural resources. Unlike fossil fuels, which are finite and create harmful emissions when burned, renewable energy sources can be replenished naturally and emit little to no greenhouse gasses. This makes them a crucial component in the transition to a low-carbon economy and a sustainable future. Solar energy has great potential in Southeast Asia due to the region's high levels of solar irradiation. Several countries in the region, including Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, have implemented policies and incentives to encourage the deployment of solar energy systems. Hydropower is another significant source of renewable energy in Southeast Asia, particularly in countries with large rivers and mountainous regions such as Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. However, the development of large hydropower projects has faced criticism due to their potential environmental and social impacts. Wind energy is less prevalent in Southeast Asia, but there are increasing efforts to develop wind power in some countries, such as Vietnam and the Philippines. However, the region's low wind speeds and limited land availability for wind turbines have limited the potential for large-scale deployment. But what is the status of the uptake of solar, wind, and hydropower energies? This paper focuses on South East Asia and the uptake of renewable energies in the past two decades. We focus on the different laws and policies in place in multiple countries and how those laws have been implemented in the countries, and what remains to be done.
The rapid economic growth in Southeast Asia has heightened concerns about its environmental sustainability, particularly in relation to CO2 emissions. Despite the growing focus on climate change mitigation, the region faces significant challenges in balancing economic development, energy transitions, and environmental conservation. Existing studies often overlook the complex interplay between these factors, leaving a critical gap in understanding how tailored strategies can address country-specific dynamics. To bridge this gap, this study introduces the “Sustainable Energy-Environment Nexus” (SEEN) framework, which integrates economic growth, energy transitions, and environmental conservation as interconnected elements necessary for achieving carbon neutrality in both the short and long run. Using data from eight Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, China, South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, and Japan) over the period 1990–2023, this study employs the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach and the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) technique to analyze the relationships between CO2 emissions, GDP, financial development, forest areas, renewable energy, non-renewable energy consumption, and trade openness. The findings reveal that GDP and non-renewable energy consumption significantly drive CO2 emissions in countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, and South Korea. Conversely, forest areas, financial development, renewable energy, and trade openness are effective in reducing emissions in countries such as Vietnam and China. This study highlights the critical role of renewable energy adoption while addressing challenges such as inadequate infrastructure and limited technology transfer. It also identifies opportunities for regional cooperation in innovation and policy harmonization. To support sustainable energy development, tailored policy recommendations include incentivizing investments in renewable energy, enhancing technology transfer, expanding forest conservation efforts, and aligning regional renewable energy targets across ASEAN. The SEEN framework provides a robust foundation for advancing research and policy design aimed at reducing CO2 emissions and promoting environmental sustainability across Southeast Asia.
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This meta-analysis examines the phenomenon of green decoupling in global supply chains following 2020, synthesizing evidence from 47 empirical studies. We analyze how environmental regulations and geoeconomic tensions have jointly influenced supply chain reconfiguration across manufacturing sectors. Our systematic review reveals three primary patterns: (1) accelerated nearshoring in carbon-intensive industries under stringent environmental policies, (2) diversification strategies balancing cost efficiency with regulatory compliance, and (3) technology-driven optimization enabling simultaneous emissions reduction and supply chain resilience. Statistical analysis of 156 firm-level restructuring decisions demonstrates that environmental regulation stringency (β = 0.42, p < 0.001) and geopolitical risk exposure (β = 0.38, p < 0.001) independently predict supply chain reorganization. However, their interaction effect (β = 0.15, p < 0.05) suggests synergistic dynamics. Results indicate that green decoupling is most pronounced in automotive, electronics, and chemical sectors, with estimated emission reductions of 18-34% alongside supply chain regionalization. These findings contribute to understanding how firms navigate the dual pressures of sustainability imperatives and geopolitical fragmentation in post-pandemic global economy.
This article argues that powerful Western militaries are central architects of the necropolitics underpinning contemporary green and digital transitions. As climate change is increasingly framed as a security threat, NATO, the United States and the European Union pursue climate‐resilient defence infrastructures whose material foundations depend on strategic minerals extracted under conditions of armed conflict, displacement, sexual violence and premature death. We conceptualize a colonial necropolitical war‐climate‐extraction cycle in which colonial histories of violence, contemporary resource wars, climate securitization and critical‐mineral extraction become mutually reinforcing. Focusing on eastern Congo, we examine conflict‐mineral laundering, the US‐sponsored peace‐for‐extraction accord, EU–Rwanda strategic partnerships and the Lobito Corridor. We show how these initiatives transform conflict minerals in Congo into secure resources for green, digital and military transitions while obscuring the necropolitical conditions of their production. Climate‐resilient defence thus reproduces a global division of protection in which some populations are secured while others are rendered expendable.
The dominant narrative considers the green energy transition as a direction to energy autonomy and less geopolitical antagonism. This article questions that assumption. Based on US Geological Survey data on mineral production, trade flow statistics of the UN Comtrade database, and with the help of the International Energy Agency projections, this paper uses Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) analysis to measure the concentration of three key raw materials lithium, cobalt, and graphite. The comparative case study of EU and US legislative reactions, in particular, the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, charts the policy architecture of de-risking. Results indicate that the midstream processing segment of CRM supply chains is more concentrated than petroleum during the OPEC period with one jurisdiction dominating between 58 and 87 percent of all battery-grade material refining worldwide. The discussion puts these findings into the context of the interdependence theory of Keohane and Nye, that the transition is not a liquidation of energy-based power asymmetries but a reorganization into more inflexible, less replaceable choke points. The article concludes that strategic pluralism in response to supply chain weaponization in the emerging mineral-security order is the only possible option; that is, diversifying not only suppliers but also the underlying technologies.
Amid China's rise and intensifying China–U.S. competition in the Indo–Pacific region, it is widely consented among international scholars that a key strategy in Southeast Asia's statecraft and geopolitics is the adoption of “hedging” against great powers, to maximize economic gains and mitigate security risks. For more than two decades, academic, strategic, and policy studies of Southeast Asia's hedging strategies have contributed a wealth of diverse scholarship, which increasingly influences the academic, strategic, and policy debates among emerging powers and small- and medium-sized littoral states in the Indo–Pacific region. This article reviews the literature and identifies key theoretical developments and research gaps. In response to the recognized conceptual–methodological gap in effectively addressing, capturing, and mitigating the structural uncertainties and security risks arising from great power rivalry, this article outlines a futurist approach to anticipatory methodology. Using a Taiwan contingency for scenario planning in which the U.S. and China engage in armed conflict over Taiwan, it imagines possible, plausible, probable, and preferable scenarios, corresponding policy options, and identifies the limits and strategic scenarios that South Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam would likely consider and encounter. This article concludes that to preserve a suitable external security environment for hedging to maximize economic gains and minimize security risks, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will need to work closely not only with ASEAN member-states but also with partners to anticipate different future scenarios and proactively prevent the worst-case scenario of a Taiwan contingency from occurring. A novel conceptual contribution of “anticipatory hedging” is therefore made to advance the theoretical development of hedging.
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ABSTRACT ASEAN’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific is often framed as a strategic shift, but this paper argues it is instead a continuation of its established hedging strategy. Drawing historical parallels, particularly Thailand’s colonial-era diplomacy, the article examines how ASEAN balances major power competition while preserving autonomy. By assessing ASEAN’s economic and security engagements with China and the United States, the paper highlights how hedging remains essential amidst intensifying geopolitical tensions. The Indo-Pacific framework does not require ASEAN to choose sides but reinforces its flexibility. ASEAN centrality, as enunciated by many global powers, has given much impetus to the organisation to continue with the hedging strategy. As the US–China rivalry deepens, hedging offers ASEAN the best path to stability and strategic relevance.
In the early 21st century, China has increasingly recognized the critical importance of securing its national energy supply. As the demand for energy continues to rise, China has implemented an assertive and comprehensive energy diplomacy strategy on a global scale, with Southeast Asia emerging as a key focus. The region holds a geo-strategic significance, rich in vital natural resources such as oil, natural gas, and other minerals, making it a strategic partner in China’s broader energy security objectives. This policy, driven by China’s growing energy needs and its desire to diversify energy sources, has far-reaching impacts on Southeast Asia, influencing various sectors including economics, politics, and national security. China's energy diplomacy in Southeast Asia is not only an economic endeavor but also a means of strengthening political alliances and asserting its regional influence. This paper explores the nuances of China's energy diplomacy policy towards Southeast Asia in the early 21st century, highlighting its strategic objectives, the mechanisms employed, and the broader implications for regional and global security dynamics.
: China's economic rise has brought Southeast Asia the dual challenges of economic dependence and se-curity autonomy, prompting it to adopt a hedging strategy. China has formed a complex interdependent relationship with Southeast Asia through trade, investment, and infrastructure cooperation, which has helped regional development and strengthened its strategic autonomy needs. Realism, constructivism, and complex interdependence theories reveal the logic of Southeast Asia's balancing the influence of major powers, being influenced by historical cognition and ethnic politics, and the spillover of econom-ic cooperation into the political field. Southeast Asia's hedging strategy presents a dual logic of "eco-nomic dependence-security balance": deepening economic and trade cooperation with China while bal-ancing risks through multilateral mechanisms or external forces. The research concludes that China should deepen cooperation through differentiated strategies, focus on infrastructure and industrial chain coordination in the short term, strengthen multilateral mechanisms, and enhance cultural identity in the long term.
Energy security has increasingly become one of China’s most important strategic interests amid rapidly growing energy demand and a rising dependence on external sources of supply. This article examines the role of energy security in the formulation and implementation of China’s neighborhood diplomacy toward Southeast Asia. Drawing upon a neoclassical realist approach, combined with document analysis and process-tracing methods, the study elucidates the relationship between energy security imperatives and the adjustment of Beijing’s foreign policy toward its neighboring region. The findings indicate that Southeast Asia occupies a particularly significant position in China’s energy security strategy due to its role in international maritime routes, especially the Strait of Malacca, as well as its potential for energy cooperation and regional connectivity. Challenges related to the security of energy supply and transportation have prompted China to strengthen cooperation with ASEAN, expand energy investments, develop connectivity corridors with Myanmar, and increase its presence in strategic spaces such as the South China Sea. The study concludes that energy security constitutes one of the key drivers shaping China’s neighborhood diplomacy and helps explain Beijing’s growing influence in Southeast Asia during the first decades of the twenty-first century.
"Connectivity" has become the organising objective of economic policy in Southeast Asia, invoked alike by China's Belt and Road Initiative, ASEAN's Master Plans on Connectivity, the European Union's Global Gateway and the Indo-Pacific strategies of the United States and its partners. This article asks what conception of the economy the idea presupposes, how its rival programmes embody rival economic philosophies, and what its epistemic and moral consequences are. A critical conceptual review is conducted on a documented corpus of 86 Scopus-indexed publications retrieved on 9 September 2026, spanning international political economy, development studies, regionalism, urban studies and the digital economy, read through the philosophy of economics, political discourse theory, infrastructure studies and moral economy. Connectivity performs three philosophical operations: an ontological one, which pictures the economy as flows across a friction-laden space in which every "gap" is a deficit; an epistemic one, which converts political choices into technical problems and renders the concept an empty signifier that any programme may fill; and a normative one, which presupposes that integration is good while lacking a theory of how its gains and harms are distributed. The Chinese state-led and the Western rule-based models are read as consequentialist statism and proceduralist liberalism respectively, both variegated in practice by developmental-state legacies and zoning technologies. ASEAN hedging is reconstructed as a pragmatist epistemology of economic statecraft under Knightian uncertainty. The knowledge of infrastructural risk is shown to be co-produced by social forces rather than measured, and the harms of connectivity to fall on those least connected to its decisions. The article brings infrastructure into the philosophy of economics, offers the first systematic philosophical reading of the Southeast Asian connectivity literature, and proposes a research agenda for a normative and epistemological theory of economic integration. Keywords: connectivity; philosophy of economics; neoliberalism; Belt and Road Initiative; hedging; ASEAN; infrastructure; moral economy; political economy
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China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea has intensified security pressures on Vietnam. However, existing studies have not fully explained why Vietnam prioritizes bilateral cooperation with the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. This article addresses this gap by examining Vietnam’s alignment choices from 2016 to 2024 through Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat theory. Using a qualitative within-case design, the study operationalizes Walt’s four variables - aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions - to analyze how Vietnam interprets China’s behavior and why these perceptions push Hanoi to strengthen ties with the three Southeast Asian partners. The findings show that China is the only actor that fulfills all four components of a perceived threat, while the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia are viewed as non-threatening states with shared interests in upholding maritime rights under the UNCLOS. As a result, Vietnam expanded defense exchanges, coast guard cooperation, and diplomatic coordination with these partners to mitigate China’s strategic advantages. This article contributes to existing scholarship by providing a structured, theory-based explanation of Vietnam’s selective mini-lateral cooperation, which is an underdeveloped aspect in existing scholarship.
The article analyzes the interactions between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, examines bilateral political and economic contacts as well as outlines key bilateral disputes and mechanisms for their resolution. The author concludes that Vietnam conducts a policy of strategic partnership with Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in order to strengthen its position within the ASEAN, to prevent the dominance of China and the United States in Southeast Asia and to provide stability and security in the region.
Ever since the end of World War II, the Republic of China (ROC), led by the Kuomintang Party and continued by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) led by the Communist Party, with its Eleven Dash Line (EDL), has claimed almost 90% of the South China Sea (SCS) waters, including the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, and all sea structures in that area. In 1953, the EDL was renamed to the Nine Dash Line (NDL) because China gave the area of the Tonkin Gulf to North Vietnam, led by Ho Chi Minh, which was still at war against the French and South Vietnam. China’s NDL claim has overlapped with Brunei’s claim, specifically Louisa Reef located on its continental shelf, Malaysia’s claim covering a portion of SCS in northern Kalimantan (Borneo), which includes at least 12 maritime structures in the Spratly Islands, among others, the coral reefs Swallow, Adraiser, and Marivelles. Additionally, the Philippines' claim includes the northernmost part of the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal, known as Kalayaan in the Philippines. Vietnam's claim encompasses the Paracel and Spratly Islands, including 25 rock and sand formations and islands such as Spratly Island, Namyit Island, and Barque Canada Reef. The overlapping claims, which also occurred between Brunei and Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines, and Malaysia and Vietnam, have increased tension and incidents in the SCS, particularly between the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam against China due to China’s actions forcefully imposing its claim. This has made the situation more complex and fragile, leading the international community to term the overlapping claims as the South China Sea (SCS) Dispute. has no claim in the SCS, and no other country has a claim over Indonesia. However, in 2009, when China registered its new map of NDL claim with the United Nations (UN), it included part of Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna Sea (NNS). The UN rejected this claim since it was not based on international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982). Indonesia firmly denied that claim as it goes against Indonesia’s law and UNCLOS 1982. Due to increasing Chinese actions in imposing its claim on part of the IEEZ in the NNS, including Gray Zone Operations (GZO) maneuvers, Indonesia has risen to defend its sovereign rights in the NNS. According to UNCLOS 1982, in the IEEZ at the NNS, as a coastal state, Indonesia "has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living resources, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and off the sea bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone such as the production of energy from water, currents, and winds" (Article 56; 1 a). To overcome any disturbance and threat toward Indonesia’s sovereign rights in its EEZ in the NNS, Indonesia needs to convince China to nullify its IEEZ NNS’ claim. Indonesia needs to launch total diplomacy toward China, including cultural diplomacy, economic diplomacy, and defense diplomacy combined with and supported by defense capability. In this regard, Indonesia should increase its defense capability, particularly in the NNS, to guard the works, personnel, and equipment of the activities of natural resources exploration and exploitation. The enlargement of defense capability, including the quality and quantity of equipment and weaponry such as patrol boats, troopships, warships, hunter jets, fighter jets, radar systems, and Geographic Information Systems (GIS), should be done by optimizing the use of advanced technology. Determining the performance strategy, as well as the use of technology and interoperability systems in developing the defense equipment platform, information and communications technology such as Big Data and Data Links, can be a solution to increase and integrate the defense system, capability, and operational implementation. In this case, particularly by the Indonesia Navy and Air Force, by integrating various defense equipment owned and used. This study provides a comprehensive analysis of Indonesia’s strategy to counter China’s Gray Zone Operations in the North Natuna Sea.
This paper analyzes the differing policy responses of Southeast Asian countries – such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines – to the US–China competition over critical mineral resources. It also examines how these countries prioritize various national interests, including economic development, resource security, and policy autonomy. The study finds that Malaysia primarily adopts a light hedging approach, balancing economic cooperation with both the United States and China to maintain the stability and development of the rare earth supply chain. Simultaneously, it leverages external resources to drive industrial modernization, demonstrating high flexibility and policy independence. In contrast, the Philippines, as an upstream supplier of nickel resources, employs a heavier hedging strategy. While deeply embedded in China's supply chain, it gradually attracts investments from the United States and its allies to reduce dependence on a single market. The differences in these strategies reflect how resource‐based Southeast Asian countries adjust their policies to balance economic development and security needs amid geopolitical rivalries based on their resource endowments and supply chain positions. Malaysia's approach emphasizes balance and economic benefits, while the Philippines' strategy highlights dual objectives of resource security and industrial upgrading. Indonesia has also maintained a light hedging strategy in response to US–China strategic competition, prioritizing the development of a critical mineral industry centered on nickel. This approach aims to promote foreign trade and industrial growth in a rational and strategic manner, thereby maximizing economic gains. Vietnam, by contrast, occupies an intermediate position among the three countries, adopting a moderate hedging strategy that leverages its advantage in rare earth and other mineral resources to strengthen cooperation with major powers. However, due to ongoing tensions between China and Vietnam, their cooperation on critical minerals remains uncertain and warrants further observation. With Trump's re‐election and the increasingly intense trade war between China and the United States, critical mineral resources are bound to become a core and crucial point of competition between the two countries in the coming period. Whether it is Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, or the Philippines, adopting relatively independent mineral policies not only helps safeguard their own economic security but also offers valuable lessons and inspiration for other resource‐rich small states in Southeast Asia.
Abstract The evolving global order and regional dynamics have profoundly impacted China-Southeast Asia relations. As the world grapples with the geopolitical implications of intensified US-China competition, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries find themselves navigating a complex interplay of opportunities and challenges. The US-led Indo-Pacific strategy has significantly reshaped the geopolitical landscape, yet Southeast Asia’s relations with China are marked by interwoven challenges and opportunities. This special issue includes six papers that cover Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and the Philippines, illustrating how small and medium-sized states navigate an increasingly multipolar world. A central theme across the papers in this special issue is the critical role of domestic factors in shaping each country’s relationship with China.
ABSTRACT
China’s Policy Strategies for Green Low-Carbon Development: Perspective from South-South Cooperation
No abstract available
Amid the accelerating global low-carbon transition and a shifting geopolitical landscape, China and Russia face growing incentives to deepen green cooperation. However, empirical research on the drivers and constraints shaping bilateral cooperation remains limited. This study applies the Driving Forces-Resistance framework to examine the dynamics of China-Russia green cooperation through textual analysis, comparative assessment, and case studies of the Tianwan and Xudabao nuclear power plants and the China-Russia Eastern Route Gas Pipeline. Drawing on bilateral policy documents from 2006 to 2025 and data from the WIPO Global Innovation Index 2025, the study identifies four key driving forces: strategic consensus, economic complementarity, shared interests in global climate governance, and multi-level cooperation mechanisms. It also identifies three major constraints: structural, institutional, and technical and financial. Structural constraints are reflected in Russia’s continued dependence on oil and gas revenues, while institutional constraints arise from differences in technical standards and certification systems. Technical and financial constraints are associated with disparities in innovation capacity and limited access to green financing. Based on these findings, the study proposes a phased set of policy measures, including mutual recognition of green technology standards, a green cooperation sub-fund, a Far East green project matching platform, and joint green technology laboratories. The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the factors shaping China-Russia green cooperation and provide targeted theoretical and policy insights for its further development under the Green Belt and Road framework.
China and ASEAN economic cooperation is moving towards green development, with multiple collaborations underway in the construction of new energy infrastructure such as photovoltaic and hydropower. Meanwhile, both sides have introduced various policy measures to promote cooperation in the new energy vehicle industry and the development of carbon assets. Analysis of the characteristics of green economic development in ASEAN countries reveals that Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia have become key partners in building a green cooperation framework between China and ASEAN due to their advantages in economy, institutions, and resources. Additionally, given the distinct characteristics of green economic cooperation between ASEAN countries and China, it is necessary to advance cooperation through complementary industrial chain resources, deepening the concept of green development, and strengthening policy support.
Abstract This paper explores the practical needs, current status, challenges and countermeasures in the green development cooperation between China and the Arab States of the Gulf. Green development is regarded as a new development model and ecological philosophy for achieving sustainable and scientific development. Its core elements include the rational use of resources, proactive environmental protection and the maintenance of ecological balance. In the context of global economic integration and sustainable development, both China and the Arab States of the Gulf have adopted green development as a key initiative to drive social progress, establishing it as a fundamental national policy. Cooperation between the two parties primarily focuses on four key areas: advocating green policies, constructing green environments, advancing green economies and promoting green cultural exchanges. The goal is to jointly promote economic and energy transitions, thereby achieving sustainable development. However, challenges such as a singular trade structure, external competitive pressures, difficulties in aligning technologies and standards, as well as financing and investment risks, persist. Looking ahead, China and the Arab States of the Gulf are expected to deepen their green development cooperation, contributing to global economic prosperity and stability, while creating a new era of mutually beneficial cooperation.
This paper conducts a comparative analysis of green finance policies in the European Union (EU), China, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), aiming to draw relevant policy implications for Vietnam in the context of green transition. By examining legal frameworks, incentive mechanisms, financial instruments, and private sector involvement, the study reveals that each region follows a distinct approach. The EU stands out for its comprehensive legal architecture, including the EU Taxonomy for sustainable activities and stringent environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure requirements. China adopts a state-led green finance model, with a strong policy push and oversight by the People’s Bank of China, combining regulatory incentives and financial guidance. ASEAN, meanwhile, is in a formative stage of policy development, focusing on harmonizing green standards, promoting regional green bond markets, and enhancing cross-border cooperation. Based on these insights, the paper proposes strategic recommendations for Vietnam, including the development of a robust legal framework for green finance, the establishment of a national taxonomy aligned with domestic priorities, and the strengthening of financial institutions and regulatory capacities. In addition, the paper emphasizes the need to incentivize private sector participation and create an efficient green capital market. The findings contribute significantly to Vietnam’s efforts in building a resilient green finance ecosystem that supports long-term sustainable growth. This study offers valuable guidance for policymakers, regulators, and financial actors engaged in the green transition.
The global energy transition is increasingly shaped by industrial competition, supply chain restructuring, and fragmented regulation. Morocco seeks to turn its renewable energy potential into green industrial capacity, while China has become an important partner in renewable-energy infrastructure, battery materials, storage, and hydrogen. This study examines whether China–Morocco energy cooperation is moving from individual projects toward green industrialization, and what conditions shape its sustainability outcomes. Using a qualitative case study approach, it analyzes policy documents, legal texts, corporate announcements, project records, and international organization reports from 2016 to June 2026. The project database covers twelve projects: four operational, three under construction, three signed, one awarded, and one announced. The findings show an emerging, partial, and uneven shift in project composition that points toward a potential project-to-industry transition, though industrial upgrading remains largely prospective. Chinese investment may support Morocco’s renewable deployment, manufacturing localization, and participation in low-carbon value chains, but these gains depend on domestic supplier linkages, workforce skills, technological absorption, environmental governance, and institutional coordination. European Union (EU) due-diligence rules and United States (U.S.) clean energy policies also create regulatory exposure and compliance pressures that may shape project ownership, sourcing, production standards, and export-market access. The study argues that foreign green capital alone does not constitute green industrialization. Sustainable progress depends on Morocco’s ability to anchor individual projects in local capabilities while adapting to a fragmented geoeconomic environment.
Green energy cooperation between the United States and China emerged as a strategic effort to address global climate change during the period from 2021 to 2024. This research explores the dynamics of this cooperation, highlighting both the opportunities and challenges faced by the two countries. Employing a liberal interdependence theoretical framework, the study employs qualitative methods, with library research serving as the primary data collection technique. Despite existing geopolitical differences, both countries advanced green energy development under the leadership of Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping. Opportunities for collaboration arose from various factors, including changes in leadership, enhanced dialogue, positive responses, global interdependence, formal agreements, and the strategic role of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Key areas of cooperation encompassed investment in green technology, knowledge transfer, and collaborative research efforts. However, challenges during Biden's administration were inevitable and continued to persist even after the administration ended due to divergent domestic policies and priorities arising from changing leadership, technological competition, and ongoing political tensions. Greater difficulties are anticipated as Donald Trump returns to office. The study concludes that cooperation in green energy between these two major economic powers is vital for the global energy transition and efforts to mitigate climate change; nevertheless, significant challenges must be addressed to facilitate positive trends and achieve progress.