韩国与以色列及土耳其军工发展及战略自主性比较：背景过程异同、战时军事指挥权回收、实现可能性及战略自主国家或美国延伸据点

… the effect of defence industrialization on their military … differences and similarities among the states discussed here suggest the need for additional in-depth single case and comparative …

… China did conform to the classical model of defense industrialization … are not alone in valuing defense-industrial autonomy, the extent … These trends, however pale in comparison to the …

The international arms production and market have been experiencing significant changes since the end of the Cold War. For some scholars, this transformation represents the “globalization” of defense production. The transformation involves an increasing level of cooperation between the defense firms, involving coproduction/development, partnerships, mergers and acquisitions, and joint ventures, in response to increasing costs of arms production and R&D. The process would lead to adoption of an export-oriented defense-industry policy, market liberalization, privatization, and integrative defense-industrialization policies because the cooperative relations could ease the pressures on the defense firms and national budgets. While this process creates opportunities for emerging countries to develop their defense production capabilities, they would be better off if defense-industry policy follows a limited goal that is focused on the niche markets. Other analysts disagree with the impact of “globalization.” They question the viability of the globalization concept by showing that the level of integration and cooperation changes across regions. While the level of integration has not reached the expected levels in Europe, other countries continue to aim for self-sufficiency in arms production despite the financial penalties. Despite the careful reasoning and excellent research of scholars, the effects of the transformation on international politics and the driving forces of defense industrialization remain obscure. In order to address this problem and reach an in-depth understanding of defense industrialization and its impact on international politics, we organized an e-workshop series at Columbia University with Stephanie G. Neuman. Our goal is to unearth the interplay between domestic and international factors to understand the variance in defense industrialization and its impact on states’ foreign policy and the implications for international politics. Articles in this special issue are the continuation of our efforts to reach a better understanding of transformation in global arms-production practices and their implications for international politics.

ABSTRACT This article describes how Sweden developed a hybrid defence-industrial infrastructure with three prioritized ‘essential strategic interests’ pointing to parts of the domestic defence industry: ‘a partial strategic autonomy’. The article focuses on Sweden’s declared three essential security interests – combat aircraft capability; underwater capabilities; and integrity-critical parts of the command, control, communication and intelligence domain (C3I). The article finds that the possibilities and ways forward for the essential security interests vary, with a general trend towards more shared and increasingly partial autonomy. Six change factors are formulated as drivers towards Sweden’s partial strategic autonomy of today: Autonomy as a result of failed internationalization; Techno-nationalist perception of Sweden leading to industrial protectionism; Strategic choice; Corporate lobbying; Export incentives leading to political support of technologies; and Europeanization of the EU defence industry. Techno-nationalism and strategic choice are the factors with the most evident impact. The overall governance of the defence industry is clear on the priority of ensuring security of supply and a high degree of autonomy regarding the three essential security interests. Other parts of the defence industry operate under globalized and more competitive conditions. In order to apply increased economic rationality and strive for shared autonomy, Sweden must increase its engagement in multilateral arms collaboration.

… This article addresses defense industrialization among the … about securing geopolitical and strategic autonomy as it is … over USD 11 million apiece (compared to around USD 8.5 million …

… examines defense industrialization in three leading arms-producing states in Asia – India, Japan, and South Korea – and how their experiences compare to China's recent defense …

… and backing the industrialization of products resulting from … EU member countries of defense material compared with the … Spanish defense industry in collaborative programs compared …

ABSTRACT Countries with limited financial resources, internal markets, and human resources, such as Turkey, face significant challenges in achieving defence autarky and competing with multinational corporations in the international arms market. Consequently, the literature suggests that these countries should adjust their defence industrialisation goals to match their financial capabilities. However, Turkish decision-makers maintain a public discourse emphasising the goal of defence autarky despite the defence industry’s financial crises and structural problems. Even though there is a growing recognition of the limits of the pursuit of defence autarky, Turkey still needs to devise a defence industrial policy focusing on niche markets. This paper argues that the persistent rhetoric of defence autarky enjoys very strong public appeal in domestic politics. Defence industrialisation, coupled with nationalism, creates a zone of impunity for the ruling party. This dynamic allows the ruling party to deflect criticism by highlighting successes in defence production, directly appealing to nationalist sentiments. Ultimately, the political gains for the ruling elites outweigh financial limitations, preventing an open shift toward a more moderate defence industrialisation goal.

The post-Cold War era is placing the defense industry at a crossroads. If, on the one hand, it is under great pressure to guarantee warlike efforts around the world, with tight budgets and uncertain lead-times, on the other hand, it is seen as a central instrument for national sovereignty and foreign policy. The purpose of this research is to report the state-of-the-art of the existing literature and explore the most relevant research areas in order to provide the conceptual basis for further empirical research. To do so, this study uses a preferred reporting items for systematic review and meta-analysis (PRISMA), which is an adequate technique as it allows one to discover concepts, ideas, and debates about the defense industry. The results evidenced three different approaches to the defense industry—integration, autarky, and domination. In that regard, we present several case studies in which the defense industry is used as an instrument of foreign policy or national sovereignty. Future studies may focus on empirical research to validate the theoretical findings or to identify variables that lead some defense industries to seek synergies, resorting to mergers and acquisitions, while other defense companies prefer to obtain State funds.

ABSTRACT The urgency to better understand small and middle powers’ defence industrial activities is growing, both from a scholarly and a practitioner’s perspective. Few states today possess the defence industrial capabilities to produce all, or even most, of their armaments domestically. With rising development costs, greater complexity inherent in modern military technology, and intensified global market competition, the prospects for states aspiring to build up domestic defence industries, or sustain the ones they already have, look increasing poor. In the face of these strong headwinds many small- and medium-sized powers continue to pursue domestic arms production. What drives them to do so? In this introductory essay to the special issue, we provide an overview of some of the most significant developments in global arms production and how this shapes the choices states are making about their defence industries.

This article examines the forces driving the pursuit of military production capacity in India, including those behind the Indian nuclear and space programmes. We are mainly interested in whether symbolic motivations regularly find expression in the public discourse. We review all articles on the subject of weapons development and production appearing in India Today from May 1977 to April 1999. There are three closely interrelated yet distinguishable concerns in the public discourse that we consider symbolic: that military industrialization is a means of asserting India's autonomy in international affairs, that it is a means of establishing India's international status and prestige, and that it serves to enhance India's self-image. We contend that the symbolic motivations are a prominent force behind the military industrialization process in India. The precise form that symbolic motivations take vary—some statements seem to have more symbolic content than others—but, as a whole, such references are not rare or isolated. Our findings suggest that symbolism can be an important component of the quest for an indigenous arms-production capacity, and perhaps other elements of statebuilding as well.

Recent North Korean military provocations such as the attack on the South Korean warship Cheonan in March 2010 and the artillery bombardment on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 have increased uncertainty of the Korean Peninsula and heightened the possibility of another serious military confrontation between South and North Korea. This situation may demand the ROK and the United States to reexamine the transfer of operational control authority, which was scheduled to occur in December 2015. Military leaders, political decision makers, and scholars of international relations from both the ROK and the United States would be well advised to undertake a series of politico-military games to examine how to effectively deal with situations such as North Korea's military provocations, WMD threat, and possible sudden collapse after the scheduled transfer of wartime OPCON. The transfer itself should not be the goal. Also, North Korea's recent military attacks should not be seen as isolated incidents. Rather, they could be the side effects of the change in the ROK-US military relationship and the harbinger of a more serious and uncertain future.

… OPCON and its history, the current wartime OPCON transfer … to view the wartime OPCON transfer debate will be examined… out whether the wartime OPCON transfer decision is right or …

Much conventional thinking on conflict in Northeast Asia assumes Japan’s military normalization and South Korea’s operational control (opcon) transfer will increase tensions and heighten the risks of violent conflict. This paper will argue it is time to review and reassess such thinking by asking whether military normalization in Japan and opcon transfer in South Korea can enhance regional stability and peace. Using an interdisciplinary approach comprised of theoretical elements from the literature on rivalry dyads, historical grievance discourse analysis and conflict management, this paper creates a framework of ‘conflict management process flow’ in an attempt to lessen issue dissonance and reassess these two policies. The paper begins with a basic introduction of the issue at hand, followed by an explanation of what is termed a process map of conflict management flow-a tool for reframing rivalries. Section three is a general discussion of tensions and conflict in NE Asia, guided by the concepts of rivalry dyad and status dilemma. The paper proceeds with two case study sections. The first being an examination of military normalization by Japan and its possible affect on rival neighbors; the second discussing the issue of opcon transfer in South Korea and its possible affect on rival neighbors. The paper concludes with thoughts on the prospects for enhanced regional stability should military normalization in Japan and opcon transfer in South Korea occur. This paper may be unique in its attempt to evaluate these policies as elements of the conflict management process and harbingers of peace.

Strategic effects of military alliances notwithstanding, to assume that their policy will proceed without difficulties is problematic. The ROK‐US alliance began transferring the wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK in early 2003. However, the transfer did not proceed as planned, experiencing two delays in June 2010 and October 2014 with a significant format change to the Condition‐based OPCON Transition Plan (COT‐P), meaning the addition of prerequisites for the transfer and the death of the original parallel command structure. What have been the causes of these phenomena and resulting stagnation? This article argues that the allies' strategic consensus over the transfer and the policy coordination in the initiating ally are the main causes of the lethargy. Additionally, this study finds that the impact of the strategic consensus is greater than that of the ROK's policy coordination, as the former is demonstrated in all three indicators of the progress: timeliness, post‐transfer command structure, and the certification assessment through exercises.

This article examines the United States ‘extended deterrence’ commitments to the Republic of Korea (South Korea). It argues that hostile North Korean intentions, perceived to be backed by capabilities to pursue them, have led South Korea to reassess both US extended deterrence and its own security policy. The quantum leap in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities in the past decade, coupled with its recent military manoeuvres, echo the tensions on the Peninsula in the 1970s. So does the US response of augmenting US-ROK security cooperation and the presence of strategic assets in the region. In the 1970s, a similar US response included also threats of abandonment to persuade President Park Chung-hee to stop his quest to pursue an independent nuclear weapons programme. Park’s programme and the allies’ security dialogue in the 1970s highlighted ROK outstanding issues regarding US extended deterrence. At present, with North Korean missiles capable of reaching anywhere in the United States, these issues have become even more pronounced. To address this, and to counter South Korean arguments in favour of an independent nuclear deterrent, the United States should assist South Korea to achieve full operational control over an imposing conventional second-strike capability.

… military industries, as in the case of Argentina.For many states, however, an indigenous arms industry … driving LDCs to produce arms can be summarized quite easily: autonomy, that is, …

… were producing or planning to produce weapons domestically. This paper examines the arguments for indigenous Third World arms production in the context of the Turkish case. The …

… The third reason, perhaps most important of all, has to do with the domestic political gains of defence industrialisation: the AKP uses defence industry and indigenous weapon systems …

Abstract Although the study of secondary state behavior has increasing scholarly attention, existing studies suffer from a serious defect: privileging defensive over offensive behaviors. This is mainly due to the problems of status-quo-bias and anarchy-centrism engulfing the discipline of International Relations. This leads scholars either to ignore offensive state behaviors or treat them as aberration. This could be corrected if the struggle for autonomy is taken as the primary motive behind state behaviors. Defensive and offensive state behaviors, then, can be given equal treatment. Defensive state behaviors aim to maintain whereas offensive state behaviors seek to expand autonomy. Secondary states may display risky offensive behaviors to expand their autonomy. I shall examine this argument against the empirical evidence provided by Turkish foreign policy after 2016. I argue that the policy of strategic autonomy determines Turkish foreign policy and in the context of this policy Turkey follows a leash-slipping strategy to expand its autonomy.

Turkish foreign policy has dramatically transformed over the last two decades. In the first decade of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) rule, the ‘logic of interdependence’ constituted the driving motive of Turkish foreign policy. In the second decade, however, the ‘logic of interdependence’ and the soft power-driven ‘mediator–integrator’ role were gradually replaced with a quest for ‘strategic autonomy’, accompanied by interventionism, unilateralism and coercive diplomacy. This article explores the causes of this dramatic shift. We argue that ‘strategic autonomy’, which goes beyond a moderate level of status-seeking compatible with Turkey's material power credentials, has a double connotation in the Turkish context. First, it constitutes a framework for the Turkish ruling elite to align with the non-western great powers and balance the US-led hierarchical order. Second, and more importantly, it serves as a legitimating foreign policy discourse for the government to mobilize its electoral base at home, fragment opposition and accrue popular support. We conclude that the search for autonomy from its western allies and the move towards the Russia–China axis has led to Turkey's isolation and permitted the emergence of new forms of dependence.

Strategic autonomy has become a guiding principle for several states as the international order moves toward multipolarity. Turkey has also attempted to carve out a more autonomous space from its traditional Western allies by building new ties in the non-Western world, ranging from the Russia–China axis to the Middle East and beyond. This paper explores the idea and practice of strategic autonomy in Turkish foreign policy. We argue that strategic autonomy is not pre-determined or mechanically driven by ‘hedging’ behavior. We conceptualize strategic autonomy with reference to its three fundamental dimensions: structural orientation, political motive, and economic infrastructure. In this context, we highlight two soft spots in Turkish foreign policy since 2011. First, geopolitical imperatives and domestic policy priorities often contradict each other, which prevents the country from effectively implementing autonomy-seeking policies. Second, strategic autonomy is mainly associated with ‘high politics’ without paying proper attention to its geoeconomic dimension in the form of solid political economy fundamentals and economic security.

ABSTRACT State investments in domestic defence industries are one of the most puzzling trends in international relations. Economists contend that these investments waste resources, while political scientists claim that armaments’ resultant overproduction fuels arms races. Why then do governments cultivate defence industries? I draw on cases from Israel, South Africa and Iraq to argue that the answers to these questions are distinct. Fears about supply security frequently spur states to begin developing arms industries, and elites’ techno-nationalist beliefs often sustain their defence-industrial investments. Defence industries’ primary national security value, however, lies in their hitherto unappreciated contribution to states’ military adaptation capacity.

… efforts to produce indigenous weapon systems ranging from … autonomous foreign policy and so-called ‘strategic autonomy’… deteriorating political relationship with Israel, Turkey, in line …

… , common security, and arms control in order to reduce military risks and burdens as well as military dependencies … of the European pillar of the transatlantic political-military alliances. …

… capabilities as much as possible in order to reduce this dependence to a mm1mum. … security strategy: the Jewish state's affinity for patron-client relationships rather than alliances; its …

… self-reliance and alliance dependence is that, without the US … US alliance assists Australia in its quest for regional security in … of the US alliance, Australia has access to the latest military …

This article aims to assess the dynamics of Australia’s contemporary defence policy by examining its shift from the Self-Reliance doctrine towards the Strategy of Denial and the implications of this shift for Southeast Asia’s regional security architecture. The central research problems concern the persistent contradiction between Australia’s declaratory commitment to self-reliance and its deepening alliance dependence on the United States, the impact of China’s rising aggregate power and assertiveness, and the ways in which these developments reshape Southeast Asian security and hedging behaviour. Methodologically, the study employs process tracing combined with balance of threat theory, drawing on historical analysis of defence white papers, official strategic reviews, and regional responses to initiatives such as AUKUS. The significance of the research lies in clarifying how a middle power recalibrates its defence posture under structural pressure, and how this recalibration affects ASEAN states that cannot independently balance China and instead pursue various hedging strategies. The findings demonstrate that Australia has adopted a hybrid Strategy of Denial that maintains alliance integration while enhancing denial capabilities, an evolution that simultaneously reassures and unsettles Southeast Asian states.

Secondary states that engage in external balancing are willing to trade some autonomy for the increased security that comes with the protection offered by a great power patron. However, mitigating their dependence on that very patron remains an important concern for all balancing secondary states. In this article, we draw on network analysis to explain how secondary states balance security and autonomy in the context of (external) balancing. We transcend dyadic representations of patron-protégé relations and posit that (balancing) secondary states think strategically about how to leverage their multiple relationships in their pursuit of both security and autonomy. Concretely, we expect balancing secondary states to resort to vertical and horizontal binding, respectively, by (1) affirming their utility to and interdependence with a balancing network’s hub to improve their network centrality and (2) strengthening their ties with other secondary states or nodes so as to improve their betweenness centrality and lessen their dependence on the hub. To probe our theory’s plausibility, we examine how Japan and Poland have sought to reconcile security and autonomy in light of mounting Chinese and Russian revisionism.

India is the fifth-largest economy and one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. It has a well-established defence industry in both the public and private sectors, and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to develop indigenous technologies. Several initiatives have been introduced to strengthen the domestic defence industry, including the ‘Make in India’ campaign that increased foreign direct investment in defence companies, grants to support defence start-ups, and a negative import list for defence products. However, India remains heavily dependent on imports of foreign arms. This study focuses on understanding the relationships between various factors impacting India’s achievement of self-reliance in defence capability. Aspects such as defence budget affordability and allocation, envisaged defence capability to face security risks, development of innovative defence technologies, embracing new warfare concepts in keeping with emerging trends and current defence acquisition processes and procedures to enhance self-reliance have been analysed through a Systematic Literature Survey. Based on these inputs, India has presented a conceptual model for achieving self-reliance in defence capabilities.

… the reality of defence dependence on the US; moreover, … ' represents a tenable basis for security policy only so long as … to preserve Australia's qualitative military advantage. The …

… self-reliance by placing one's defense in the hands of foreign states, and (3) the high economic cost of military … becoming highly dependent on a powerful ally or alliance. Therefore, if an …

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… impact, I estimate aggregate export values for 2027 by determining the elasticity of defense export values and defense export … nificant export opportunity for nations such as South Korea. …

specific policy recommendations for strengthening the export competitiveness of the Korean defense industry, such as establishing an integrated control tower, expanding trust-based cooperation

ABSTRACT What are the drivers and conditions of South Korea’s defense industry development? What makes South Korea’s growth experience unique? Departing from recent headlines that focus on increasing arms exports, this paper re-visits the key internal and external drivers of defense industry development to unpack what defense industry success entails. The goal is to offer a more nuanced account of the political-economic developments by focusing on the role of the government and technonationalism as the internal factors, and the North Korea threat and the ROK-US alliance as the external factors. In totality, these drivers positively influenced the pursuit of South Korea’s defense industry development under a national commitment to self-reliant defense. At times, however, they created tensions from within regarding how to proceed with indigenous arms development and arms exports, which have become vital assets of South Korea’s defense industry today and will continue to shape its future.

… Like other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the modernization of its armed forces is a … Indeed, throughout the 1990s, South Korean arms exports never exceeded US$75 million per …

… integration and prosperity in this region. This study analyzes how South Korea and Japan consider the US as a military ally in the context of the China-North Korea alliance by using the …

… often exert considerable influence over national decision-… attack from North Korea but for futureoriented, regional great-… In 2003, ROK arms exports purportedly reached $355 million—…

The global arms industry has experienced a major transformation in the post-Cold War era, with production becoming increasingly transnational and larger in scale. While many scholars and policymakers predicted the widespread adoption of market-enhancing reforms aimed at increasing domestic competition and attracting FDI, globalization of arms production has not led to a convergence of national defense industries into a liberal- market model. Drawing on the varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature, recent scholarship has demonstrated how an interdependent web of economic institutions has shaped each country's response in varied ways. This paper builds on the VoC literature and argues that the hierarchical market economy (HME) as a distinct variety serves as a better model for understanding the trajectory of defense industries in many second-tier producers that do not fit the existing categories of VoC. We conduct an in-depth case study of South Korea's defense-industry reform initiated in 2008 and the subsequent threefold increase in its arms exports. We show that the trajectory of South Korea's defense-industry reform can be seen as the result of an HME's attempt to adapt to the globalization of arms production in ways that preserve its distinct comparative advantage. As the HME model has broad applicability for many countries in Asia and Latin America, our findings have important implications for future developments in the global arms industry.

… , South Korea has endeavored to diversify its influence beyond … For South Korea, defense exports serve as both an … expertise into strategically significant regions. Both nations are …

South Korea’s economy has been heavily depend on major power countries such as US, China, Japan, and Russia. However, with the changing dynamics in international world such as growing protectionism in US during Trump leadership, China’s expansion of influence in Asia, as well as trade war between US and China causing President Moon Jae In to switch South Korea’s economy horizon. New Southern Policy is a diplomatic initiative established to reduce those dependence. South Korea invites India and ASEAN as its brand new partners. South Korea stated that Indonesia is a major partner in New Southern Policy. This research aims to analyze the impact of New Southern Policy in Indonesia, especially in economy and defense sectors. The impact on economy sectors are both countries agreed to signed IK-CEPA agreement, South Korea which eager to make Indonesia as new production base in ASEAN through Hyundai company factory construction, and LG Consortium investment in the electric vehicle battery cell industry. Moreover, the impact on defense sectors is joint venture project for the production of KFX/IFX fighter jets.

… military influence and defence market footprint globally. … the industry to navigate regional challenges and financial crises … Most notably, the lack of systematic defense export data prior to …

<ns3:p>Amid shifts in the global power structure, the defence industry is emerging as a crucial sector for economic development and national security. It is closely related to the industrial structure and developed in the form of the military-industrial complex (MIC). This article examines South Korea’s defence industry development strategies to explore actionable insights for Poland. By integrating technological advancement with robust support for the defence sector, South Korea has crafted a unique model that strengthens technological autonomy and security in a volatile global economic and political order. The impact of South Korea’s defence industry on its national economy is evident in employment generation, technology innovation, and dynamic partnerships with the private sector, underscoring its role in economic resilience and competitiveness. The article highlights the potential benefits for Poland, which faces its own geopolitical challenges and modernisation needs, in drawing from South Korea’s experiences. With a strategic focus on enhancing civil-defence sector cooperation, technological innovation, and international partnerships, Poland could bolster its industrial growth and defence capabilities, contributing to long-term economic security and regional stability.</ns3:p>

In 2021, the then–Australian Prime Minister announced the accelerated creation of what became Australia's Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise. The authors of this Perspective discuss the objectives of the GWEO Enterprise and examine options to achieve these objectives, specifically whether to build weapons domestically or buy them abroad.

… strategy policy development. Successfully applying industrial policy to defense would have a … to those proposed above for the US defense industrial policy. Specifically (in their order): …

… US defense regions in the post–cold war era, highlighting the interplay between shifting federal priorities and defense industry policies, large defense … federal defense policies and large …

… warfare demand, with additional needs for industrial policy, both domestic and allied, during … elevating defense industrial policy to a more strategic level, in both national policy planning …

… contracts to identify mandates for technology transfer, local content, and licensed production, which we consider to be a characteristic feature of a developmentalist industrial policy that …

… This research utilizes open data sources released by the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, the Defense Industrial Policy Committee, SSB Turkey, and the Turkish Ministry of …

… alliances under stress. This article responds to that theoretical and empirical puzzle by arguing that the autonomy-security trade-off (AST) model—typically applied to alliance formation …

… The US demand that its allies reinforce their autonomy poses both an opportunity and a … In this sense, Seoul should reconsider its national defense reform plan, currently focused on …

Relations between the United States and the Republic of (South) Korea (ROK) have been dominated, since 1950, by the security situation on the Korean peninsula and the challenges of building a prosperous and democratic South Korea post World War II. While US leaders have frequently prioritized the security dimension of the relationship, thereby reinforcing the position of the ROK’s authoritarian leaders, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, they have also been instrumental over the post-war period in advancing gradual democratic reform in which South Korean progressive actors (particularly students, labor unions and other representatives of civil society) frequently played the decisive, leading role. Since the ending of the Cold War, the ROK’s democratic governance has become consolidated, while the security challenge represented by North Korea has grown as Pyongyang has acquired nuclear weapons and enhanced its conventional weapons and missile delivery systems. Following the Obama Administration’s pivot to East Asia and the development of Washington’s new Indo-Pacific strategy, the opportunities for enhanced alliance cooperation has increased, not merely on security matters, but also in a range of areas including pandemic prevention, climate change alleviation, and enhanced economic collaboration to enhance supply-chain resilience and the sharing of critical technologies. At the same time a more confident and economically prosperous ROK is keen to boost its strategic autonomy to reflect its own geopolitical and geoeconomics priorities. This chapter addresses the continuities and changes in this dynamic and successful alliance relationship which remains mutually beneficial to policy makers and the publics of both countries.

Allowing a foreign military in a sovereign country is often controversial. Yet, the United States has had hundreds of military facilities in foreign nations, including South Korea and Türkiye (Turkey) for nearly seven decades. The two American allies have traded partial autonomy in return for the military assistance of the U.S. This study selects the two G20 member states for a comparative case study, given their geostrategic importance to the U.S. defense agenda from the Cold War era to the present. This article aims to elucidate how American military bases are politically affected by the security situation and anti-Americanism in the host nations. Furthermore, this paper underscores the imperative for both countries to recalibrate their stances on American military bases amid the continuously evolving international political landscape, utilizing the Autonomy Security Trade-off Model as a framework.

… were constantly redefining their existing relations and seeking … autonomy and security exists in the logic of military alliances, … the context of the US–Korea–China triangular relationship. …

… of the ROK-US alliance, and how South Korea's alliance policy should change to accommodate … a cooperative self-defense policy, the principle of autonomy in national security decision-…

… between the US-Korea alliance and the US-Japan alliance. With relations between Tokyo and Seoul … a greater desire for autonomy amid still strong support for the alliance in the Korean …