2024斯里兰卡选举：泰米尔与穆斯林投票偏好、需求与忠诚度；人民解放阵线政策影响；僧伽罗佛教民族主义及阶级族群交织的走向

… However, the loss of approximately 2.3 million votes compared to the 2024 presidential election also re lects a signi icant level of public discontent or waning enthusiasm toward the NPP…

… significant political shifts during and after the 2024 elections. This chapter reflects on the above-… Consistently high voting percentages are a positive dimension of Sri Lankan electoral …

This chapter investigates the evolving role of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as a political mobilization tool in Sri Lanka, in the backdrop of the 2022 economic crisis and the rise of the National People's Power into power in 2024. We argue that NPP has reshaped Sri Lanka's political landscape by shifting the primary axis of polarization from traditional majoritarian nationalist rhetoric to a discourse centered on anti-establishment and anti-corruption sentiments. This shift represents a form of ‘transformative repolarization’, which is a counter-polarization strategy that redefines the political field itself. The chapter also explores the evolving nature of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism in the post-Aragalaya context, identifying its emerging themes, key actors likely to serve as its main articulators, and the role they are poised to play in shaping the future of national politics.

How defeated insurgencies adapt to democratic politics without a formal peace accord remains an under-theorized puzzle in post-conflict studies. Existing frameworks, focused on negotiated settlements or military victories, offer few tools for explaining this increasingly common pathway. This article addresses this gap by theorizing ideological compartmentalization: the structural separation of a protected, rigid ideological core from a flexible, public-facing front designed for broad electoral competition. This dual structure enables strategic oscillation: shifts in which ideological compartment is emphasized to respond to the political context. This article tests the argument through a longitudinal analysis of Sri Lanka’s JVP (2015–2024), drawing on party manifestos and official media. The findings reveal that the JVP’s official outputs deployed a universalist, anti-corruption technocratic populist register, while keeping Sinhala-nationalist commitments comparatively less visible in those same arenas, a pattern consistent with compartmentalized public signaling. This study challenges linear models of rebel-party moderation by offering a new theoretical framework for understanding how former insurgents may navigate ideological contradictions to achieve electoral success, providing a new framework for analyzing a growing number of post-conflict cases where defeated groups remain influential political actors.

The major objective of this study is to identify the nature of political participation of different groups in a multicultural communal context. The study was carried out based in the Ampara District in the eastern province of Sri Lanka. The Ampara district has been a multicultural space from the formation of the district in 1961 and has been influential in electoral politics in ethnic context. This study has incorporated both primary and secondary data collected from different sources. The collected data has been descriptively analyzed. The study has found that „patron-client relationship‟ of the political culture working as a mobilizing initiator for electoral turnout among the three major ethnic groups in the district. However, establishment of the distinctive political party for their own, Muslims of the coastal area of the district marked a major departure point of the community‟s pattern of political participation. This development was a reaction to intense ethnic conflict between two major constituent ethnic groups of the country, i.e. Sinhalese and Tamils. The study has also found that there is a different pattern of political participation between the traditional inhabitant Sinhalese and the settlers in colonization schemes in the district. The traditional villagers show less interest in electoral politics while Sinhalese in the colonies have been very active. This is a shared feature of both Muslims and Sinhalese living in the colonies. On the other hand, the Tamils living in the area tends to amend to the political orders of the Tamils political elite based in Colombo and Jaffna. They tended to isolate themselves from other political parties. The study concludes that until Sri Lanka find a lasting political solution to the ethnic issue, segregation and fragmentation in multi-cultural context remains the pattern of electoral politics and building an overall Sri Lankan identity is next to impossible.

… there were not enough Tamil and Muslim voters to elect their own … the Sri Lankan voter behavior. We also need to look at how the minority voters behave in local and provincial elections …

This article bridges Sri Lankan studies and the academic debate on the relation between contemporary Islam and politics. It constitutes a case study of the Muslim community in Akkaraipattu on Sri Lanka's war-ridden east coast. Over two decades of ethnically colored conflict have made Muslim identity of paramount importance, but the meanings attached to that identity vary substantively. Politicians, mosque leaders, Sufis and Tablighis define the ethnic, religious and political dimensions of “Muslimness” differently and this leads to intra-Muslim contradictions. The case study thus helps resolve the puzzle of Sri Lankan Muslims: they are surrounded by hostility, but they continue to be internally divided. Akkaraipattu's Muslims jockey between principled politics, pragmatic politics and anti-politics, because they have to navigate different trajectories. This article thus corroborates recent studies on Islam elsewhere that argue for contextualized and nuanced approaches to the variegated interface between Islam and politics.

ABSTRACT Elections are a cornerstone of any functioning democracy, providing a vital platform for citizens to express their political will and engage in the governance of their nation. Sri Lanka, renowned for its competitive electoral landscape and vibrant party mobilization, conducted peaceful elections on September 21, 2024. The results marked a significant victory for the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and its coalition, the National People's Power (NPP), which triumphed over prominent candidates Sajith Premadasa and Ranil Wickremesinghe. Both candidates had pledged commitments to decentralizing power and implementing economic reforms recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), reflecting a broader desire for change among the electorate. This article primarily examines the trends surrounding Marxist leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake's struggle to earn the trust and votes of the Tamil and Muslim communities in the North and East.

Following the military defeat of LTTE terrorism in May 2009, the relationship between ethnic and religious groups in Sri Lanka became seriously fragmented as a result of intensified anti-minority sentiments and violence. Consequently, the ethnic Muslims (Moors) became the major target in this conflict. The major objective of this study is to critically evaluate the nature and the impact of the anti-Muslim sentiments expressed and violence committed by the extreme nationalist forces during the process of ethnic reconciliation in post-war Sri Lanka. The findings of the study reveal that, with the end of civil war, Muslims have become “another other” and also the target of ethno-religious hatred and violence from the vigilante right-wing ethno-nationalist forces that claim to be protecting the Sinhala-Buddhist nation, race, and culture in Sri Lanka. These acts are perpetrated as part of their tactics aimed to consolidate a strong Sinhala-Buddhist nation—and motivated by the state. Furthermore, the recourse deficit and lack of autonomy within the organizational hierarchy of the Buddhist clergy have motivated the nationalist monks to engage in politics and promote a radical anti-minority rhetoric. This study recommends institutional and procedural reforms to guide and monitor the activities of religious organizations, parties, and movements, together with the teaching of religious tolerance, as the preconditions for ethnic reconciliation and ethnic harmony in post-war Sri Lanka. This study has used only secondary data, which are analyzed in a descriptive and interpretive manner.

Sri Lanka’s post-independence ethnoreligious tussles show how drastically the island has moved away from pluralism. Indeed, the country represents an illiberal democracy that operates like an ethnocracy. Not only is Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism now embedded, its proponents are determined to consolidate further majority domination while ensuring minority subordination, leading to a “schadenfreude nationalism” wherein many among the majority community take pleasure seeing minorities hagridden and marginalized. This, however, has not prevented various groups engaging with ethnoreligious minorities, learning of their challenges, and involving them in societal relations as distinct yet equal Sri Lankan citizens. This covenantal pluralism can thrive, provided the island’s major stakeholders champion it. The failure to do so will prevent Sri Lankans from achieving their full potential as citizens and leave the island further diminished.

… 21If the predominantly Sinhalese Buddhist ethos of Galle can be said to account for the virtual absence of Muslims from the electoral fray, the predominantly Tamil character of Mannar …

Following the end of the thirty years old civil war in Sri Lanka, there were expectations that the post ‐war period would usher in peace, development and reconciliation. The last four years have witnessed several positive developments including resettlement of people and rehabilitation of infrastructure. Nonetheless there are range of problems and policy gaps that have hindered the transition from war to sustainable peace. A key post-war challenge is that of violence against religious sites and members of religious communities . More recently, from last year, there has been an unprecedented level of violent attacks, demonstrations and hate speech targeting Sri Lanka’s Muslim population. It noted a ‘sharp uptick’ in religiously-motivated violence and said the authorities are ‘passively and sometimes actively’ condoning extremist Buddhist groups, Mainly perpetrated by Buddhist-fascist fundamentalist groups, such as the ‘ Bodu Bala Sena’ or ‘Buddhist power force’ and the Hela Urmaya or Sinhala Heritage Party are the main groups behind these targeting of Muslims. The events have left the country’s second largest minority community - the Muslims feeling afraid and vulnerable which forcing a concerted campaign against them. In addition to attacks on places of religious worship there are calls to boycott Muslim shops and establishments, all of which is increasing tensions, particularly in areas where Muslims and Sinhalese live close to each other. These were virtually programmed by some prominent and influential personalities in governing circles, besides others who had a vested interest in seeing Sri Lanka imploding amid heightening ‘communal tensions.’ On this context, this study focuses on the recent incident of violence against Muslims in Sri Lanka. The primary objective of this study is to examine the motive for violence against Muslims as well as impact of the violence. The fundamental questions of this research are the following: why does post- war violence and hate propaganda arise against Muslim in Sri Lanka? In which ways the violence against minorities, particularly Muslims impact on reconciliation process? And why does Buddhist nationalist hegemony arise soon after civil war in Sri Lanka? This study is based on an interpretive approach. The data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. In addition to primary sources, qualitative interviews were conducted with selected specialist on this particular research area. I conclude that after end of war against LTTE by government of Sri Lanka, religious tension has been increased in the recent past and the government’s reluctance even to take firm action against to perpetrators which would be helpful in restoring the rule of law and security of Sri Lankan minorities has been a big hurdle in the post -conflict situation and government are perceived to serve only the Buddhist side and to marginalize those holding legitimate grievances.

Since the end of war in Sri Lanka in 2009, the landscape of the reconciliation process has come under critical debate. In response, the Sri Lankan government efforts in reconciliation and all other types of efforts are seemingly on increase for achieving peace. In this light, the paper critically examines both practice and theoretical development of how “justice” in the reconciliation can impact on “positive peace” as a greater peacebuilding effort evident to be useful in post-war Sri Lanka. It is debated how reconciliation experienced at all societal layers have considered “justice” as a prerequisite for successful outcomes. Therefore, given the empirical evidence, the paper has prioritized how social justice, removal of cultural barriers and consideration on a wider scope of human rights, regarded in “justice” become a core contributory factor of Sri Lanka`s reconciliation. And these attempts lead for structural changes using of different peacebuilding approaches i.e., “national” and “grassroots”. However, in Sri Lanka reconciliation has experienced a number of vital challenges. These challenges are the complex nature of the process, broken consensus on “justice” among people, politicized decision-making, policy gaps and many more. While investigating important empirical findings about the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka, the paper critically examines the use of different reconciliation approaches and how far “justice” has been criticized within the implementation. The study has utilized content analysis and a descriptive narrative to examine the research problem. The discussion arrives at a conclusion of using of both national and grassroots peacebuilding approaches and serious emphasis on “justice” would let reconciliation to be closer in achieving “positive peace”. The discussion also reveals the complexities of such achievements unless addressed on “trap” conditions i.e., lack of economic reconstruction, social and emotional competencies, trust, healing and forgiveness.

… political interests of the Sri Lankan government in relation to the global discourse of transitional justice, and which has its own politics … a terrorist problem or legitimate Tamil grievances. …

… grievances in post-war societies. Our study suggests that it is often difficult to distinguish corruption from ‘normal politics… ethnic grievances. Relations between people and the state in the …

Abstract This paper analyses the role of roadbuilding as a process of state territorialisation in post-war Sri Lanka. In the aftermath of a brutal civil war (1983–2009), and in lieu of a broader peace and reconciliation process between Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim communities, road infrastructure has been promoted by the state as essential to the region's recovery and nation's sovereignty. Roads were to bring national unity and political integration. We interrogate such claims, drawing on fieldwork conducted in Jaffna and neighbouring areas to cast doubt on the prospects of new roads to ameliorate ethnic tensions. Rather, as militarised security discourses and policies continue to dominate the Sri Lankan public sphere, such schemes can be understood as part of broader Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist project to consolidate territorial control in restive parts of the country. Our research suggests that, rather than facilitating rehabilitation and recovery, road networks mirror pre-existing fault lines and entrench the privileged position of the military in Sri Lankan society. Such shifts do little to avail persistent minority sentiments of political marginalisation, aggravating social fractures and re-constituting the hegemony of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism.

… an Office of Missing Persons to register grievances of victim families. The government … post-war realpolitik prevalent in Sri Lanka, to unknot the political crisis surrounding Sri Lanka…

… Western Nepal and eastern Sri Lanka, this article explores how political legitimacy is constructed and contested in post-war environments. We posit that in the post-war context there are …

… The Sri Lankan Tamils increasingly nursed the grievance of … on the political leadership of what we could call Sri Lanka's "… hoped-for recovery of the postwar economy, especially in the …

A sizable portion of Sinhala-Buddhists, including monks, supported the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna(JVP)-led National People’s Power (NPP) in the recent September 2024 presidential election. The results indicate that the JVP captured a significant share of votes from Mahinda Rajapaksa’s traditional Sinhala-Buddhist base. A key political symbol of the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist ideology is the preservation of the unitary state structure introduced during British colonial rule.Emerging in the late 1960s as a radical leftist political entity, the JVP initially advocated for social justice and anti-imperialism. However, over time, the socio-political dynamics among Sinhala-Buddhists have shaped the party’s ideology and its relationship with the Buddhist clergy. This commentary examines the interactions between the JVP, Buddhist monks, and Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony, highlighting their mutual influence on Sri Lanka’s political landscape.

The 2024 Sri Lankan presidential election marked a transformative juncture in the country’s political trajectory. Conducted peacefully with high voter turnout, the election demonstrated robust civic engagement and a collective desire for change. The unexpected victory of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), in alliance with the National People’s Power (NPP), signified a major shift in political alignments, as voters rejected traditional parties in favor of a new governance model. This article examines the core factors that shaped voter behavior, focusing on the ethnic, socioeconomic, and political dimensions that influenced the electoral outcome. While the NPP–JVP coalition secured overwhelming support from the Sinhala-majority population, it faced resistance from Tamil and Muslim voters in the Northern and Eastern provinces. This divergence highlights underlying ethnic and regional complexities that continue to shape national politics. Furthermore, the coalition’s success in attracting former supporters of the Rajapaksa regime reveals a broader realignment of voter loyalties amid economic hardship and governance fatigue. By analyzing the 2024 results through the lenses of political behavior, institutional integrity, and social sentiment, this study provides critical insights into Sri Lanka’s evolving democratic landscape and the prospects for inclusive governance and political reform.

… A large percentage of minority communities strongly believe that the NPP could bring all … people are no longer ready to listen to all those old narratives about the JVP political party. …

… focus on minority rights. The JVP framed Tamil separatism as a direct threat to Sri Lanka’s … has entrenched the JVP-NPP coalition’s dominance in Sri Lankan politics, and underscored …

… the JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) alliance is the most favoured political player among overseas Sri Lankans … representing the ethnic Tamil and Muslim minority communities. …

Religion is often regarded as a divine concept resistant to change or transformation, yet history reveals that religion can evolve and transform into new cults or religious movements. This reformation or alternative state of religion is often considered an aberrant version of the original. In Sri Lanka, an aberrant form of religion emerged during the modernization and colonization periods, particularly influenced by Protestant groups and urban Buddhists. The significance of this aberrant form of Buddhism is that it lacks the depth of true religious thought and is instead reflected in the mainstream of politics and nationalism rooted in race. Due to the demand to protect Buddhism, which was echoed by this aberrant version, the recognition of Sri Lanka’s diverse ethnic and religious identities gave rise to separatism and a fragmented form of nationalism. One of the key features of aberrant religion is its tendency toward fundamentalism and extremism, as it becomes distorted in the name of safeguarding religion. The consequence of aberrant religion was the fabrication of nationalism tied to ethno-religious identities, particularly among the Sinhalese majority, turning non-violent Buddhist thought into violent racism that cultivated discrimination in cultural values and even escalated into civil war to defend Buddhism and promote Buddhist nationalism. However, in time, the post-nationalist protest movement known as the “Aragalaya” rejected the pathological nationalism generated by aberrant Buddhism and brought about a systematic shift towards a unified nationalism. Thus, this study reflects on the formation of aberrant versions of religion in Sri Lankan history, their extension into nationalism and race, and the continued presence of aberrant religion in the contemporary context.

Sri Lanka's postindependence history suggests that continuous efforts by the Sinhala‐Buddhist politicians to reject decentralization created anxiety and distrust among minorities. The state used both Sinhala language and Buddhism to accommodate Sinhala‐Buddhist interests and provide cultural security to Sinhala‐Buddhists who feared that the Sinhala race, Buddhism, and heritage would be threatened with destruction by the Tamil and Muslim separatists and extremists. The state forced the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which demanded a separate state for North and Eastern Tamils, to silence its guns in May 2009. The military defeat of the LTTE did not produce any democratization of the island. Sinhala‐Buddhist extremist forces turned their eyes on Sri Lankan Muslims, whose elites attached to major political parties supported the war against the LTTE. This study examines the politicization of the Sinhala language and Buddhism in Sri Lanka before and after the civil war between the LTTE and the state dominated by the Sinhala‐Buddhists. It argues that Sinhala political elites willingly took measures to centralize power. The major result of centralization is the birth of the state‐seeking, but authoritarian LTTE. It will also provide some useful analysis to examine post‐war tensions between the Muslims and the Sinhala‐Buddhist extremists. Finally, I discuss some solutions to fight the rising authoritarianism to help Sri Lanka enjoy the fruits of modernization and democracy.

… The Sinhalese majority has been characterized in academic … this tendency of Sinhala Buddhist nationalists to define existential … Sinhala Buddhist nationalist movements in Sri Lanka and …

This research aims to examine Buddhist and Islamic radicalization in Sri Lanka, focusing on how Buddhist radicalization preceded Islamic radicalization and its impact on the social cohesion and politics of the country. The study employs a qualitative approach with a case study design, analysing data from relevant literature, political documents, religious texts, and media reports. The analysis was conducted using a thematic approach to identify key patterns related to ethnic identity, religious politics, and inter-religious tensions. The research findings indicate that the radicalization of Buddhism, rooted in the ideology of Sinhala-Buddhism, has generated social tensions that have worsened relations between Buddhists and Muslims, which, in turn, has fueled radicalization within the Muslim community. The rise of the National Thowheed Jama'ath (NTJ) in response to anti-Muslim violence is a clear example of Islamic radicalization triggered by the politicization of religion and the injustice faced by Muslims in Sri Lanka. This study highlights how the radicalization of majority religions can create fertile ground for the radicalization of minority religions. The implications of this research offer important insights into how religious radicalization can exacerbate social and political polarization in a multi-ethnic country. The research also suggests the importance of inclusive policies and interfaith dialogue to reduce sectarian tensions and promote social peace. The originality of this research lies in its deeper understanding of the relationship between Buddhist and Islamic radicalization in Sri Lanka, an area that has been previously underexplored, and its contribution to the study of religious radicalization in a unique local context.

… of Buddhist constructions imposing Sinhalese Buddhist … agenda of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism propagated through state-… of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, in the post-conflict context. …

This study, based partly on archival research, tackles a number of interrelated issues regarding the sociolinguistic dynamics of language politics in Sri Lanka from the colonial era to the present. In colonial Ceylon, such politics initially manifested as resistance against foreign elements, but later evolved into internal conflicts when majoritarian Sinhala-focused linguistic purism movements appropriated Sinhala as a national identity marker. The resulting civil war until 2009 indicated that misguided prospects of linguistic purism in the name of ethnic nationalism have been a costly mistake for this small state, threatening to tear the nation apart. Regarding more recent issues of language planning and policy reforms, which also concern the place of English, the focus turns specifically to the rapid digitalisation of communication and related impacts of global virtual language environments. These substantially reduce the significance of any specific language or local vernacular, while individual and group identity is strengthened through inclusive use of linguistic registers within multilingual digital spaces.

… We have some evidence on the caste and class background of … the time of the political independence of Sri Lanka in 1948. What … nationalism of the majority ethnic group, against whose …

… -ethnic entity called Sri Lankan nation. We have to examine how the Tamils and the Sinhalese developed conflicting ethnic identities… Sri Lankans we need to use upper class-lower class …

… the Sri Lankan Government forces and the forces of the Tamil Tigers as an "ethnic conflict" … protagonists in the conflict belong to these two ethnic groups. Definition of the conflict in such …

… , and with it the political institutionalization of violence in Sri Lanka. By institutionalized … Tamil middle class, the Estate Tamil merchants together with the Sri Lanka Tamil merchants and …

… it is not as important today as ethnicity. Class and English education are also important [20:19]… Tamils language was paramount and religion was not as central to ethnic identity [20:216]. …

Since the late-19th century, for political expediency, the Sri Lankan Muslims have used Islam as a marker of identity difference which has suffered due to the tensions of religious and ethnic identity markers. Unlike Tamils and Sinhalese ethnic groups, Sri Lanka Muslim elites did not choose language as their primary identity marker but sought to differentiate themselves based on the practices and traditions of Islamic faith. These tensions have manifested in several ways, however, following the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, there has been a great strain placed on Muslim representation as questions have been asked as to whether the religious identity has laid the foundations for the radicalization of the Muslims, especially in the wake of global Islamophobia and concerns about security. Therefore, it is important to answer questions related to Islamic identity manifestation in Sri Lanka: What is the role of an Islamic religious identity in radicalizing Sri Lankan Muslims? Why did Sri Lanka become a convenient place for IS’ activities? Did religious identity alone cause the radicalization of some Muslims? This article would attempt to answer these questions by (1) revisiting the Muslim community’s identity formation before the independence, (2) explaining Islamic identity in the post-independence Sri Lanka and the political representation to win votes and mobilize support during the ethnic civil war between Tamils and Sinhalese, and (3) analyzing factors that contributed to the radicalization of Muslims, and Islam. Drawing mostly on secondary sources, the article attempts to situate Sri Lanka Muslims’ identity formation in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict and reconciliation. Using answers from interviews conducted through Zoom, WeChat, and WhatsApp, the article assesses the behavior of Sri Lanka Muslims in the face of the 2019 terrorist attack by some Muslims. The article finds that religious identity alone is not sufficient to trigger violence, as evidence suggests that underlying socio-economic as well as political grievances produce polarization and radical actions. We argue that long-standing arguments tying radical actions solely to religion may require substantial revision and need to be situated within a wider frame of national reconciliation especially if it does not consider existing contexts.

Studies of post-conflict societies have often focused on inter-ethnic group dynamics following the end of conflict, specifically the process of reconciliation between groups, or resurgence of violence across groups. This paper focuses on intra-ethnic differences with respect to defining ethnic identity. This paper will examine how the end of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict created cleavages amongst Sri Lankan Tamils with respect to how they define their ethnic identity and their ethnic group. Drawing upon 66 semi-structured interviews conducted in three regions of Sri Lanka, this paper presents three perspectives that were held among Tamils in post-conflict Sri Lanka. The first perspective was that the end of the ethnic conflict led to a loss in the fundamental tenets of the Tamil ethnic identity. The second perspective considered the promotion of a distinct Tamil ethnic identity to be a gateway to conflict. The third perspective articulated that the end of the ethnic conflict meant that the Tamil ethnic identity could move forward in a more cosmopolitan direction. The findings of this study demonstrate the importance of considering the social construction of ethnic identities, and their implications on post-conflict reconstruction.

… political, military, and diplomatic features of the Accord, then briefly analyze the domestic … in Colombo that it was security fears that caused the LTTE to be reluctant to cooperate. India …

ABSTRACT This paper examines the hitherto unexplored subject of nonstate rebels seeking the status of sole representatives. Why do nonstate armed groups seek the status of sole representatives?, What strategies do they employ to achieve the status of sole representatives?, Is the status merely symbolic, or does it fetch tangible benefits? These research questions are explored by treating Sri Lanka’s LTTE as a case study. Primary and secondary data formed the basis of the analysis. The LTTE used three strategies to achieve a hegemonic disposition within the Tamil community. They are: (1) elimination of rival groups, (2) incorporation of some groups, and (3) battlefield efficacy. The rebels used the claim of sole representation to ensure bilateral talks with the government, get the ban on it lifted, and control the proposed interim administrative structure. The strategy worked to a certain extent, but at least partially contributed to its downfall in 2009.

… Third, the escalation of ethnic conflict created both scapegoats for mass frustration and at least some perception among the Sinhalese majority that “our government” is besieged by …

… The Sri Lankan government focused on a military solution to the ethnic conflict, and defeated the LTTE on May 19, 2009. Thousands of primarily Tamil civilians in the Northern and …

Populism has been the edifice on which South Asian democracies have largely based their existence. Populist narrative, populist mandate, populist perception, and feedback mechanisms are not an exclusive category in South Asia. Accommodating a high-density population, elections have been an indispensable tool for populists in Asia. In 2022–2024, Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka experienced a change of governments, with or without elections. The recent wave of populism has shown unique characteristics that not only set South Asian populism distinct from its European counterpart but also hint at a new democratic future for the region.

… On the perspective of Sri Lankan minorities, the people of Sri Lanka voted for the … But all ethnic groups of Sri Lanka have indeed voted for a government that gives importance …

This chapter investigates the impact of constitutional amendments (2000–2021) of Sri Lanka on the landscape of democracy. Among the five amendments enacted to the current …

ABSTRACT The role of civil society during and after the Presidential Elections of 2015 in Sri Lanka created a new era in democracy-building. Civil society played a decisive role in bringing the National Unity Government (NUG) into power in 2015 and revived the space for civil society to consolidate democracy with much waited reforms in the political and governance spheres amidst challenges on the part of ethno-religious forces. The article thus explores the role played by CSOs in building democracy during NUG (2015–2019). The article demonstrates that, while Sri Lanka’s CSOs made significant progress toward democratic consolidation during the NUG, there is still a long way to go to ensure that a democratic political culture pervades all aspects of citizens’ lives which is possible only through political institutionalization. Despite Sri Lanka’s democratic accomplishments since 1931, efforts to consolidate democracy face challenges that have the potential to derail the gains made in the democratic consolidation process. The article claims that the single most critical factor in the consolidation of democracy is not only civil society but also political institutionalization. Though the article focuses on Sri Lanka, it does provide lessons for other developing countries that encounter democratic recession.

… Dissanayake’s electoral victory during the 2024 presidential election under the NPP alliance represented a drastic political change given that neither of the two main parties—the United …

… voting coincidence rates between Sri Lanka and major powers. … Power (NPP) on 21 September 2024, and the NPP receiving an … elections held in November 2024, afforded both the Sri …

… in the mainly-Sinhalese United National Party (UNP) which took power at independence, by the mid1950s virtually all politically-active Sri Lankan Tamils had opted for either the Tamil …

… into account the Muslim factor in any envisaged Sri Lankan peace settlement. … Tamil–Muslim hostility and a distinct Muslim identity formation go back to 1885, when the Sri Lankan Tamil …

… was the lingua franca in this part of the world at that time, explains why the overwhelming majority of Sri Lankan Muslims speak Tamil and not Arabic, Persian or Sinhalese as their …

… with the larger Muslim population of the island.By and large, Muslims of Sri Lanka have tended to oppose Tamil separatism, as advanced by the Tamil nationalists, including the Tamil …

… with the Sri Lanka Tamil community, so all references to Tamils are to the Sri Lanka Tamils unless … migration to the east coast districts, populated also by Sri Lanka Moors (Muslims) and …

… the Muslim political leaders of Sri Lanka who … Muslims joining the Tamil struggle against the Sri Lanka state. Thus to wean away Muslim support to the Tamil struggle and to get Muslim …

… post-war regime’s refusal to acknowledge the grievances of … in post-war Sri Lanka towards violent political ends in … , but was connected to national politics where escalating and …

… in the country, listening to the grievances of the affected communities to alleviate their … post-war environment. As a result, the political-security environment in contemporary Sri Lanka …

… led post-war Sri Lanka to significant controversies and de-humanization. In the context of lasting historical geo-political grievances … ’ in the post-war development in Sri Lanka has further …

The end of the long civil war in Sri Lanka in 2009 generated widespread expectations of a peace dividend that would enable the country to embark on a period of sustained economic growth. Recent developments have dampened that optimism, however, rekindling fears that Sri Lanka's tale of missed opportunities may continue. After showing remarkable resilience during decades of war and conflict, the Sri Lankan economy has failed to capitalize on the window of opportunity presented by the end of the military conflict. In the aftermath of military victory, there has been a sharp reversal of trade liberalization and a marked shift back towards nationalist-populist state-centered economic policies, reflecting the pressures of resurgent nationalism, an unprecedented concentration of political power in a small ruling group, and the influence of some powerful vested interests. Unfortunately, a return to the failed past policies of inward-oriented development strategies offers no viable solutions for the problems confronting small, capital- and resource-poor countries in today's globalized world. Sri Lanka must change both its political practices and economic policies drastically and urgently to cope with the huge development challenges facing it in an environment of global economic turbulence.

… JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) … NPP will not welcome such defectors into its fold, but the alliance would probably welcome minority parties interested in joining the government…

The JVP (Janatha Vikmuthi Peramuna—the People's Liberation Front) first came to the attention of the world outside Sri Lanka when it launched an abortive insurrection in 1971. In 1987, the JVP made another bid to come to power by force of arms. The insurrection of 1987–1989 was better-prepared and more deeply-rooted than that of 1971; the human costs and societal consequences of its extirpation were correspondingly greater. Although the JVP came close to achieving state power both in late 1988 and mid-1989, it was thereafter destroyed very rapidly.

Many ex-colonial countries that emerged as independent states after WW2 adopted protectionist development policies under the influence of resurgent nationalism. Yet, due to growing endogenous and exogenous pressures since the late 1970s, many countries embraced neo-liberal economic policies, largely to attract foreign capital. The newly created economic and other opportunities as a result not only led to economic growth but produced many changes in the social, political, and cultural landscape, often resulting in unprecedented inequalities, increased population mobility within and across countries, new social and political movements, and a more contentious and divisive socio-political environment. These developments also gave rise to new authoritarian tendencies among the emergent political and economic elites to contain increasing political dissent, in particular, among disaffected youth and minorities, at times leading to violent conflicts accompanied by brutal state repression. Sri Lanka’s socio-political trajectory since independence has reflected the pattern of change outlined above. In fact, the country moved on beyond early authoritarian tendencies in the 1980s to embrace a form of political populism that combined ethno-nationalism, patron-client politics, and concentration of power and resources in the hands of illiberal, rent-seeking elites. The present economic crisis in Sri Lanka, the result of the above developments, aggravated long-standing structural inequities, leading to mass agitations for change. But the incumbent ruling groups responded by adopting repressive measures, leading to increasing popular unrest.

… run the risk of perpetuating Sinhala Buddhist nationalism and endorsing authoritarian styles of political leadership in tandem with the prevailing pattern of unequal development. …

The recent military-political lineage, which enjoys unprecedented electoral success, suggests the privileged position of ‘warrior masculinities’ in the highly militarized Sinhala-Buddhist society. The election of Gotabhaya Rajapakse, a former military officer, and the defence secretary to Mahinda Rajapakse’s war-winning regime, marked the pinnacle of the Sinhala-Buddhist military discourse. Soon after the election, a wave of wall art was seen across the country. Social media was swamped with stories of youth engaged in ‘beautifying’ the cities with graffiti. The local armature artists worked long and hard hours, day and night. The people served the artist-youth with tea and snacks. Graffiti was spreading not only in cities but also in villages. Often, the artists were young males, and in some cases, there were few women involved. While the trend was contagious and spread across the country in no time, what they drew had a startling resemblance. The local artists illustrated heroic males – animals and humans depicting valour. The chapter argues that, the Sinhala-Buddhist authoritarian populist rhetoric was using the male body – both physical and virtual – as a platform or a canvas to support, sustain, produce and reproduce the existing populist ideologies.

ABSTRACT In the wake of anti-Muslim violence in Buddhist majority states in Asia, increased scholarly attention is paid to anti-Muslim Buddhist nationalism. These studies have paid particular attention to historical legacies within the confines of state borders, be they colonial or post-colonial. However, as this paper shows, the concerns raised in Buddhist anti-Muslim nationalism are not only shaped by local contexts. On the contrary, they are very much informed by global discourses and concerns. Drawing on media and globalization theory, this paper explores the transnational and global aspects of anti-Muslim Buddhist nationalism, arguing that it needs to be understood as a constituent element of global Islamophobia(s). Moreover, the paper shows that Buddhist Islamophobia cannot be reduced to being the result of Western export of Islamophobia globally. Rather, Buddhist Islamophobia has to be understood as a global as well as a globalizing phenomenon, contributing in its own right to global Islamophobia(s).

… as well as 19thcentury Sinhala Buddhist nationalist thought. The … nationalist leaders forwarded a notion of the ideal Sinhala Buddhist woman tasked with preserving the pristine, Sinhala …

… ethnic group—specifically, the Sinhalese. Based on a field survey of urban, educated Sinhala women in Colombo, Sri Lanka, … politics in high school, especially in social studies classes.…

Interpretations of ethnic and cultural nationalismin South Asia have been marked by a tension between “primordialist” and “modernist” approaches. In keeping with the more influential general works on ethnicity and nationalism (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983; Horowitz 1985; Tambiah 1989), modernist interpretations now generally prevail in scholarly accounts. These works usually trace the roots of ethnic and cultural nationalism to the social and religious reform movements of the nineteenth century, which are seen as indigenous responses to the impact of colonial rule. The emphasis given to particular aspects of colonialism varies, but includes cultural influences, such as Western education; economic factors, including changes in class structure; and political changes, such as the extension of representative government. These modernist interpretations, however, are not entirely unchallenged within scholarship, and primordialist views, which draw more direct links between ethnic nationalism and precolonial identities, remain strong in political, journalistic, and popular forums.

… and political structures in Sri Lanka. Plantation agriculture became the cornerstone of the … Consequently, this is a case where one ethnic group occupies a specific class position. …

… It was this stratum of the Ceylonese middle class which dominated the reformist movement … of inter-ethnic group conflicts in the politics of Sri Lanka. In such a competition, the political …

… Tamil population, almost wholly middle class and lower middle class oriented (professionals, … But parallel to this elitism was rivalry and competition within each ethnic group. Political …

Contemporary armed conflicts are typically intrastate conflicts in the Global South. These are often represented as global security threats, providing a justification for practical geopolitics of promoting liberal peace through elitist peace negotiations and instrumental use of humanitarian and development aid. In this context, the contemporary hegemonic discourse on peace emphasizes the synergies among liberal peace, liberal democracy, and neoliberal development. Based on recent democratic transitions, it is assumed that liberal peace can be crafted through internationally facilitated elite negotiations. This article examines this technocratic approach to peace and highlights the tension between elitist crafting of liberal peace and contextual political dynamics in conflict situations, using Sri Lanka as an exemplary case. Sri Lanka’s fifth peace process is presented as a product of international and domestic power relations and stakeholder strategies, with a convergence between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam around two defining characteristics: (1) crafting of peace through narrowly defined elite negotiations and (2) linking of peace and development through humanitarian and development aid. It is argued that the use of development as a precursor to peace politicized the issue of interim development administration and the combination of political exclusion of elites and social exclusion of intermediate Sinhalese classes undermined the government and its agenda for liberal peace. Sri Lanka is thus an illustrative case of international promotion of liberal peace but also the tensions between internationalized and elitist crafting of peace and contextual power relations and political dynamics in conflict situations. https://s3-euw1-ap-pe-df-pch-content-public-p.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/9780203723340/904b187d-8800-47aa-9571-0e53cdfefcef/content/fig00040_B.tif" xmlns:xlink="https://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"/> En el 2005, el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) puso en marcha en Chipre un proyecto de construcción de la paz denominado Acción para la Cooperación y la Confianza (ACT, en inglés). Este proyecto ha estado orientado a crear oportunidades para compañías bicomunales sobre protección ambiental, como estrategia para promover tolerancia intercomunitaria. En el artículo se discute críticamente la eficacia de aquel proyecto, como una contribución al debate sobre la significación de la cooperación ambiental para transformar los conflictos etno-territoriales. Nos apoyamos tanto en datos de campo como en las opiniones calificadas de chipriotas interesados en cuestiones ambientales, para mostrar que, en el caso de Chipre, el éxito de las estrategias ambientalistas de paz depende de una amplia conciencia ambiental, de la confianza en un tercer interesado (el PNUD) y del empoderamiento de la sociedad civil, lo cual, no obstante, debería complementar y no sustituir las otras intervenciones a nivel del estado. También existe evidencia de que el discurso del PNUD a partir de la idea de que “la naturaleza no reconoce límites” es más efectivo donde genera soluciones que se perciban como benéficas para todos los grupos implicados, más que cuando el medio ambiente es utilizado para construir retóricamente un “patriotismo” común por encima de identidades étnicas.

… government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), … island and enduring racial legacy from British colonial rule. … Lankan government through the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord in …

… Whilst the legacy of the JVP insurrection still has echoes in Sri … the LTTE and became a Minister in the UFPA government. … Thimpu Talks and the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord. The India-Sri …

Abstract The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is a good example of how peace negotiations in civil war situations can be elusive. Although several factors impinge on the outcome of negotiations, from the experience of negotiating peace in Sri Lanka three prominent and recurrent variables come to the fore. These are: first, the competing nationalisms in the state-building project of Sri Lanka; second, the political outbidding practiced by the two major Sinhalese parties; and third, the authoritarian character of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which thrives on a rationale of war and terror. These variables have informed spoiler behavior and foiled attempts at a decisive settlement of the ethnic conflict. As a result the ceasefire of 2002 at present lies in a shambles. While the failure of current negotiations does not rule out the likelihood of a future negotiated settlement, a significant reorientation in the country's political culture and mainstreaming of neglected voices and stakeholders alone would make negotiations successful.

… liberalisation, changes in the governance structure and the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. … , changes in the political/governance system and the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka (see, for example…

… war termination, political management of the ethnic conflict … re-making the state in Sri Lanka might best be imagined as … , of the war through negotiations between the government and …

… , a distinctive ethnic consciousness, and a religious and ethnic affiliation that allows for a … regional conflict while the Tamil rebels are directly engaged against the Sri Lankan government…

… of international interest and involvement in the conflict in Sri Lanka and its resolution. This is … language policy in Sri Lanka and, subsequently, the armed ethnic conflict. The perception is …

… to perpetrate ethnic conflict and gain politically. While in formal terms Sri Lanka may be a … For if we ask whether the rules governing formal democratic processes are consistently …

… ethnic conflict during last thirty years and the number of times the government and people of Sri Lanka hoped that the ethnic … of Sri Lankan government s conflict management process …

… , which had earlier facilitated a ceasefire agreement and peace talks, has been assisting the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in their informal negotiations concerning the nature, …

… In the light of the history of the ethnic conflict and … Sri Lankan government. The peace talks and the process of negotiating a settlement of the 20 year-old ethno-political war in Sri Lanka …

… Footnote1 When exploring the ebbs and flows of ethnic conflict, a twin track approach, which looks at both the domestic and the international levels of analysis, is critical. Yet, the …

The purpose of this paper is to examine the status of governance and administration in Sri Lanka in light of current crises and the impact on the quality of governance.,The mixed method approach is employed to explore the problem based on secondary data and results from two major surveys.,This paper shows political and administrative commitment and quality of governance are two basic ingredients for rapid development and fighting administrative malpractices. Sri Lanka’s system of governance is a mixture of paternalism and alliance developed through political dynasty, kinship, ethnicity, caste, religion, and elitism.,This study fills the research gap as few studies have examined the recent crises of Sri Lanka’s governance and the impacts on governance quality.,Only by implementing administrative and policy reforms will not improve governance quality in the absence of strong political and bureaucratic commitment. Moreover, global anti-corruption measures are unlikely to work in the Sri Lankan context.

… race and ethnicity, acknowledge that the rules governing institutions have been fashioned fairly. On the other hand, whenever the state's most important institutions egregiously favour …